Ethics of Research involving animals
The relationship between moral status and morally relevant features
3.27 Given that neither discussion about the moral status of animals and humans nor reference to the facts of evolution appears to provide a straightforward answer to the question of the permissibility of animal research, it may seem unclear how the debate could be advanced. In the following paragraphs, we suggest that a promising approach may be to ask what features of humans and animals could qualify them as a moral subjects (see Box 3.1), thus imposing constraints or limits on how they may be treated.
We do not start from the assumption that there is one ‘master property’ or overriding criterion which determines how beings may be treated. Similarly, for the purpose of this discussion, we do not assume that there are some species that should never be used for any purpose, nor that the acceptability of using species depends on how closely related they are to humans in evolutionary terms. Rather, we explore the possibility that there are five features, at least one or all of which may be applicable to specific animals, albeit to differing degrees, and with subtly distinct moral consequences:
- sentience;
- higher cognitive capacities;
- the capacity to flourish;
- sociability;
- and the possession of a life.
We then turn to the second, and perhaps more difficult step, which concerns the question of deciding how such characteristics should be taken into account in moral decision making (paragraphs 3.51-3.57).
Sentience
3.28 An emphasis on sentience is most commonly associated with the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham (see Box 3.3). Sentience, for Bentham, was usually understood as the capacity to feel pleasure and pain. Although the ascription of such states is not always straightforward (see paragraph 4.2), it is now uncontested that many animals are capable of feeling pain. Equally, it is uncontested that to cause pain is morally problematic and so needs to be taken into account in moral reasoning. This is the case whether the pain is suffered by a human or by any other sentient being.
3.29 However, some argue that the human experience of pain is in some relevant sense different from that of animals. It may be more intense because of a greater facility of humans to anticipate pain, or because of the disruption to social relationships that humans can suffer, for example if one member of a family suffers chronic pain. This is sometimes seen to lead to the conclusion that it might be more justifiable to use animals rather than non-consenting humans in harmful research. An alternative argument might be that humans are far more able than animals to cope with pain and suffering, especially when they understand the underlying reasons or purposes. This could suggest that beings with less-developed rational capacities are not necessarily suffering less, but more, since they are not in a position to conceptualise pain or suffering as means to ends (see also paragraph 4.17).
Higher cognitive capacities
3.30 Besides the ability to feel pain, many animals are also capable of higher cognitive capacities. Some of these appear to have great moral relevance in addition to any possible intensification of pain to which they might lead. They include: knowledge of good and evil (associated with Plato), possession of self-consciousness (Rene Descartes), possession of freedom (Jean Jacques Rousseau) and possession of a rational will, in the sense of being able to act according to selfset rules to achieve certain ends, including acting in a moral manner (Kant).
3.31 As we have said, there is a need to distinguish between a moral agent and a moral subject (see Box 3.1). Some higher cognitive capacities are clearly relevant to moral agency, since only a being capable of some of them, such as knowledge of right and wrong, may be a moral agent, subject to moral praise or criticism for its actions. The capacity for moral agency is also relevant with regard to the circumstances under which such beings can be wronged.
For example, involving a moral agent who is capable of giving consent to potentially harmful research against his or her will is commonly regarded as violating a fundamental ethical principle.10 A moral subject may lack the capacity for full moral agency, but may have other ways of expressing dissent or consent to certain treatments, for example by seeking to flee (paragraph 3.34).
3.32 Higher cognitive capacities, such as the use of language or the ability to act according to plans, can be understood as signs of intelligence. Some would say that these attributes are exclusive to humans. The discussion about whether or not animals possess such characteristics is controversial, not least because it is often closely linked to the question of whether or not an animal qualifies as a moral subject, or even as a moral agent. Some philosophers claim that, independently of any empirical research, it is self-evident that no animals other than humans have morally relevant cognitive capacities.11 However, research combining philosophical and biological expertise has significantly increased knowledge about the cognitive capacities of the great apes, and other animals including dogs, rodents, birds and fish (see Box 3.2).
3.33 Some animals are able to learn complicated tasks, such as making and using tools. There is also evidence that they engage in non-trivial forms of communication and are able to coordinate social behaviour.12 In animals such as monkeys, chimpanzees and bats, the rules of social interactions have been explored in more detail and have been described as primitive moral systems (see also Box 3.2).13 Many of these characteristics had previously been thought to apply exclusively to humans, and they were often referred to in support of claims for special moral treatment for humans. Thus, somewhat ironically, some kinds of animal research have undermined claims of the uniqueness of humans and have instead demonstrated that humans and animals share certain morally relevant properties and capacities next page
Footnotes9 See also Ryder R (2001) Painism: A modern reality (London: Open Gate Press).
10 The ethical consensus is reflected in important international guidance on medical research, such as the World Medical
Association’s Declaration of Helsinki, which developed the principles established in the Nuremberg Code.
11 See references to Caruthers, Allen C (2004) Animal Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), available at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/. Accessed on: 18 Apr 2005.
12 Riede T, Bronson E, Hatzikirou H and Klaus Zuberbühler (2005) Vocal production mechanisms in a non-human primate:
morphological data and a modelJ Hum Evol 48: 85–96.
13 See Patterson F and Gordon W (1993) The case for the personhood of gorillas, in The Great Ape Project: Equality beyond
humanity, Cavalieri P and Singer P (Editors) (London: Fourth Estate), pp58–9. However, there is also some scepticism about
such claims, see for example Wynne CDL (2004) Do animals think? (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press).