Ethics of Research involving animals
Hybrid frameworks
3.58 Hybrid frameworks contain some elements of the consequentialist theory, and some of the deontological approach. Most views in the current debate are of this form, even if there is great disagreement about the details. One prominent example of a hybrid view, although in itself not explicitly a philosophical approach, is the current UK regulatory regime, which we discuss here briefly, both for its own sake and as an illustration of a hybrid view (Chapter 13 addresses regulatory aspects in more detail). The suggestion that the current UK regulations are hybrid may cause some surprise, as it is often assumed that in its use of a cost-benefit assessment current regulations are utilitarian. This is a serious philosophical error, as we shall see.
3.59 The current regulatory framework in the UK requires that any research on vertebrate animals (and the common octopus)21 which may cause pain, suffering, distress or lasting harm must be licensed (see paragraphs 13.8-13.18). A licence is not required where no harm will be caused or when the research involves only invertebrates (excluding the common octopus). Harmful experiments for the sake of mass entertainment (such as television entertainment) are prohibited by law, and research involving animals for the production of new cosmetic ingredients is also not permitted (see paragraph 13.6).22 Although not prohibited directly by law, licences for any research involving the great apes (gorillas, chimpanzees, pygmy chimpanzees and orang-utans) are not granted as a matter of current policy. In order for licences for specific research projects to be issued, the law requires that the likely benefits of the research, and the likely costs to the animals, are considered; that ‘the regulated procedures to be used are those which use the minimum number of animals, involve animals with the lowest degree of neurophysiological sensitivity, cause the least pain, suffering, distress or lasting harm, and are most likely to produce satisfactory results’;23 and that there are no available alternatives to achieving the goals of the experiment without using protected animals (paragraph 13.17).
3.60 Pain and suffering of animals are treated with great seriousness in the current UK legislation. For example, licences may not be granted for research that is ‘likely to cause severe pain or distress that cannot be alleviated’.24 Where possible, potentially harmful research must be conducted under anaesthetic or with the use of pain relieving medicines. By contrast, animal death, if brought about without pain or suffering, is regarded as a far less serious matter. Animals that are not used in regulated procedures but killed humanely to obtain tissue samples or because they are surplus to requirements are excluded from the controls of the A(SP)A (see 13.26).25
3.61 In summary:
- The morally relevant features identified above (sentience, higher cognitive capacities, flourishing, sociability and the value of life) are all considered in the current regulations.
- The current regulations combine deontological and consequentialist elements:
– there is a de facto ban on the use of specific species, the prohibition of causing some forms of pain and certain types of research;
– within the ’permitted’ area, where reasons are weighed and balanced, the regulations are consequentialist but not utilitarian, placing restrictions on the type of goals that may be pursued.
- Licences are thus granted on a case by case basis where weighing of animal suffering in relation to the research goal is one aspect of the cost-benefit assessment, and where other considerations, such as deontological constraints, are taken into account.
- What some people might regard as costs, for example harm to most invertebrates or painless death, are not regulated in the UK.
3.62 We return in Chapter 13 to a more detailed discussion of the regulatory framework in the UK and, in Chapters 14 and 15, to further moral consideration. Here we conclude that there are several ways in which morally relevant features can be taken into account, depending on whether they are considered in the context of a consequentialist, deontological or hybrid framework. We have illustrated this analysis by focusing on the capacity for pain. It might also be possible to combine, for example, deontological frameworks with the morally relevant criterion of higher cognitive capacities, in which case animals that are merely capable of sentience might not qualify as moral subjects. These and other approaches would clearly require further development and justification, which is beyond the scope of this chapter. Our primary aim has been to illustrate the mechanism by which morally relevant features function in different frameworks.
21 More precisely, protected animals comprise all vertebrates and members of the common octopus species including fetal,
larval or embryonic forms from the mid-gestational or mid-incubation period onwards for mammals, birds and reptiles, or in
any other case, from the stage of development when the animals become capable of independent feeding.
22 Note that animal research for the testing of new household cleaners that differ insignificantly from already-marketed
products is not prohibited.
23 A(SP)A, Section 5, 5(b).
24 Home Office (2000) Guidance on the Operation of the A(SP)A 1986 (London: TSO), paragraph 5.42. This refers to Section
10(2A) and Schedule 2A of the A(SP)A which states that ‘All experiments shall be carried out under general or local
anaesthesia’. Exceptions exist when anaesthesia use is incompatible with the object of the experiment. In such cases,
Schedule 2A (Article 8 of Directive 86/609/EEC) specifies that ‘appropriate legislative and/or administrative measures shall be
taken to ensure that no such experiment is carried out unnecessarily’. Schedule 2A was imposed on the A(SP)A by the (Amendment) Regulations 1998. 25 Schedule 1 of the A(SP)A sets out ‘Appropriate methods of humane killing’.