Ethics of Research involving animals
What is the appropriate role of regulation for research involving animals?
Two views about moral agency
3.69 So far we have concentrated on the circumstances under which it may be acceptable to conduct harmful animal research. Our discussion has also briefly focused on what it means to be a moral agent (see Box 3.1). We now explore this concept in more detail, since it bears on the question of what it is to be a morally responsible scientist, and the role of regulation in generating a morally acceptable environment.
3.70 We can contrast two principal views concerning moral agency:
- According to the first, associated with Bentham and Kant, to be a moral agent is a matter of following a set of rules or principles.
- According to the second, associated with Aristotle, the requirements of moral agency cannot be formulated in terms of a precise set of principles, but rather they involve cultivating a certain set of dispositions of character, usually called virtues. These virtues are required in order to develop excellence in a practice or task (see also Box 3.3).
3.71 One motivation for virtue-based theory is that rules or principles will always be simplistic and thus may demand behaviour that is wrong or otherwise inappropriate. Virtue theorists argue that, if people can learn to become experts in making excellent judgements, then this ability is morally superior in comparison to blind obedience to rules, as well as leading to a better moral relationship between, in this case, humans and animals. This argument has significant implications for the appropriateness and nature of regulations. Regulations usually encode a rule-based morality, which might seem to be too inflexible and sometimes even morally counter-productive. It could be argued that the exercise of wise judgement by scientists is morally superior to mere conformity with regulations.
Should regulations be relaxed or tightened to achieve least risk and best moral practice?
3.72 There are several arguments in favour of stringent regulation. One aspect concerns the current social trend towards a perceived need for accountability and transparency in all areas of public life. But, more importantly, when the activities of researchers were much less stringently regulated in the past, some were suspected of questionable attitudes and behaviour. Allegations included maltreatment of animals, lack of awareness of the capacityof animals to suffer and lack of realistic reflection on the likely benefits or probability of success of experiments (see paragraphs 2.12-2.13).
3.73 The crucial question now is not how scientists once behaved, but rather how we could reasonably expect them to behave if regulations were less rigorous. The existence of any regulation is justified in terms of reducing risks, and therefore we first have to consider what the consequences of non-regulation, or less-detailed regulation, would be.28 Accordingly, scientists who consider that they are sufficiently experienced to judge the needs of animal welfare in the planning and conduct of their work might well argue that they now have acquired appropriate virtues. If this is correct, then the risk of making regulations less detailed would be small. Furthermore, consideration of ethical aspects forms part of the training of personal licence holders,29 and is beginning to be included in college and university education in the life sciences. Some take the view that continuing developments in this area might be considered another good reason for relaxing regulation.
3.74 Opponents, however, might argue that scientists have developed virtues to the degree that they have, primarily because of the regulations. They assert that a strict regulatory framework encourages scientists to be proactive in seeking out and implementing humane practices. In a less-regulated world, they might let such virtues wane, especially as a scientist’s priority is usually to make scientific progress, which may often, but need not necessarily always, coincide with ensuring the highest possible degree of animal welfare.
3.75 In this respect, it might be instructive to compare common Western approaches to a particular non-Western approach. Western practice usually focuses on beliefs and their consequences. An example of a different approach is that practised by Australian Aborigines, for whom the emphasis is on people and their relationships.30 In the Western context, causing pain or suffering to animals is recognised by some as an offence to reason and is addressed by adopting a resolution to minimise harmful consequences, for example by applying Refinement, Reduction and Replacements. In the Aboriginal approach, the subject of any offence is considered to be another being, referred to as an ’I’ or ’thou’, and a ritual apology can sometimes be offered to an animal killed to provide food or clothing. The object of this process is to inform the spirit of the animal that the act has been done in order to survive. The apology is a quest to reweave a torn religious (literally binding) relationship.
3.76 Clearly, for the UK context, the Western approach to the conflict between human and animal interests is more practicable and therefore appears to be the more preferable. But whether the harm to animals can actually be reduced depends not only on the scientific and technological means available, but also on the willingness of humans to recognise that an animal has in some (not necessarily overtly religious) sense an ’I’ or ’thou’, or is a ‘subject of experience’, qualifying it as having moral status. This thought adds an important dimension to the common Western approach and can contribute to the motivation of identifying and applying the Three Rs. In terms of the generally agreed need to minimise animal suffering, the classical Western and the non-Western approaches might therefore be considered as being morally complementary.
3.77 In summary, regulation may in some cases act as an emotional screen between researchers and animals, encouraging scientists (and others who handle animals) to believe that simply conforming to regulations is to act well. Yet, if the animal is regarded as having moral status, then the researcher should be made aware that to conduct experiments on another being without consent is morally problematic. It can be a matter of grave regret which in turn can prompt measures to reduce the need of using animals in this way rather than just because of regulatory requirements. Some form of regulation is accepted by practically all as necessary for good moral practice.31 But it is important to be aware that it may not be sufficient.
Footnotes28 Some regulations merely encode pre-existing good practice, such as the policy decision not to grant licences for research
involving the great apes, which was implemented some years after the practice had ceased in the UK.
29 New applicants for personal licences are required to have successfully completed an accredited training programme
comprising three or possibly four modules (with ‘very limited exemptions’). The first module includes a section entitled An
introduction to ethical aspects of the use of animals in scientific procedures. New applicants for project licences are required
to have successfully completed a further module which includes a section entitled Ethical aspects of the use of live animals.
See Home Office (1992) Education and training of personnel under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986, available at:
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs/training_statement1.html. Accessed on: 19 Apr 2005.
30 Clearly it is not possible to generalise from this example to a general paradigm of ‘non-Western practice’. There is a wide
spectrum of views, some of which are very close to what has been presented above as a ‘Western’ view. See, for example,
Preece R (1999) Animals and Nature: Cultural Myths, Cultural Realities (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press).