Ethics of Research involving animals
Philosophical problems with regard to assessing the welfare of animals
4.3 Some people think that it is straightforward to interpret the dispositions of specific animals, as it often appears possible to ‘read their minds’. It may seem especially easy in the case of primates such as the great apes, as they look most similar to humans. For example, some ethologists, who have studied the behaviour of animals in their natural habitat, argue that threat postures can be understood as mixtures of the human emotions of fear and aggression. Being familiar with these states, they take the view that it is possible to make accurate predictions from the postures about whether the animals are likely to escape or attack.1 Another approach would be to draw on the human capacity for empathy, which we often use successfully when we judge dispositions or moods of other humans in specific situations. Since we would feel pain on being exposed to boiling water and would rapidly retract an exposed body part, it could seem reasonable to assume that an animal that shows a similar reaction on being exposed to boiling water would feel a similar kind of pain. Furthermore, many people believe that they ‘understand’ animals with which they have relatively close interactions in their everyday life, such as dogs or cats. By using familiarity, empathy and methodological observation, many humans believe that they can assess accurately the dispositions and needs of animals. But sometimes these beliefs, however strongly held, may have little or no factual basis, and what appeared to be a self-evident truth may prove to have been an inappropriate ascription of a human form of behaviour or disposition, and a case of a simplistic anthropomorphism.
4.4 How can we verify that our observations match with the subjective experience of an animal? How can we get ‘inside the mind’ of an animal to be sure that behaviours which we perceive as signs of pain or suffering truly reflect these states? And how sure can we be that an animal which appears to be behaving normally is not in a state of pain or suffering? Philosophically, these and more general questions have been discussed under the title of philosophy of mind. The most radical and sceptical approach to assessing the dispositions of animals can be found in the 17th century philosophy of Descartes and Malebranche (see paragraphs 3.30 and 14.16). Based on a dualistic conception of mind and body, which in their view only applied to humans, they took the view that all animals were mere mechanistic automatons. Descartes, who had himself spent much time experimenting on animals, argued that animals lacked a soul, which, he believed, was required for higher cognitive capacities such as self-consciousness and the experience of pain and suffering. While animals were seen as capable of registering physical sensations, and reacting to them in different ways, Descartes suggested that the processes were not accompanied by conscious experience, claiming that animals which appeared to be in distress were really just ‘mechanical robots [that] could give… a realistic illusion of agony’.2 The philosophical and scientific bases for such views were later revised. Voltaire, commenting on his contemporary Descartes, observed: ‘Answer me, machinist, has nature arranged all the means of feeling in this animal, so that it may not feel?’ Many people found Voltaire’s view more plausible. The acceptance over the past century of Darwin’s theory that humans stand in an evolutionary continuum with other animals has further undermined the view that humans are in biological terms a radically distinct species, with exclusive capacities and dispositions (see paragraphs 4.8–4.10).
4.5 While, therefore, practically no serious contemporary philosopher argues that all animals are mere machines, there remains some scepticism about how reliably ‘animal minds’ can be read and understood. For example, even if familiarity, empathy and careful methodological observation are complemented by extensive recording of scientific evidence such as heart rate and hormonal and neural activity, the question remains as to whether it will ever be possible for humans to understand fully what it is like to be a particular animal, be it in a state of pain or even just in its normal state. This question is particularly relevant when we wish to ascertain the dispositions of animals that live in different environments to our own and possess different senses, such as the ability to hear ultrasound. In the words of the philosopher Thomas Nagel, who explored this question in some detail in a different context: will we ever be in a position to know ‘what it is like to be a bat’? Is it not rather the case that we can only know what it is like for us to imagine to be a bat?3
4.6 For the purpose of the following discussion, we make several observations:
- First, a necessary condition for meaningfully describing states of pain, suffering and other dispositions in fellow humans appears to be that we are able to describe such states in ourselves. For example, we trust that the yawning which we observe in another human corresponds to a similar state of tiredness that we experience when we yawn in a comparable way.4 Clearly, assessments made on this basis are more difficult if there are significant physiological and behavioural differences between the species being compared. Thus, it is not straightforward to claim that a primate, a cat or a snake that yawns feels tired in the same way that we might. While there is therefore some truth in the observation that we will never be able to know what it is like to experience the world from the point of view of a particular animal, such a requirement is mostly irrelevant with regard to assessing pain and suffering in laboratory animals. The fact that we will never be able to obtain proof of our hypotheses by getting ‘inside the mind’ of an animal does not prevent us from making the best possible approximations. Nagel’s thought experiment therefore emphasises primarily the reality of subjectivity (i.e. it supports the view that it is plausible to assume that the way bats experience the world differs significantly from the ways beings that lack the capacity to perceive ultrasound experience it), rather than supporting the sceptical Cartesian view (see paragraph 4.4). By implication, it also enjoins us to compare animal welfare not exclusively to human dispositions, but to strive for alternative ways that may help to identify possible constraints on animal welfare, for example by considering their species-specific capacities and corresponding needs.
- Secondly, it is correct that humans will inevitably have to apply concepts such as pain, suffering and distress, which are used commonly and successfully in human-human interactions, when dealing with welfare assessments of animals. This means that care needs to be taken to avoid unwarranted anthropomorphism in using these terms.5 Similar care in avoiding bias is required when making inferences based on familiarity, empathy and methodological observation.
4.7 In view of these observations, how are we to go about assessing welfare in other animals? We acknowledge that all welfare assessments of animals are imprecise and imperfect to a certain degree. However, we also take the view that meaningful assessments can be made. We therefore consider that the concept of critical anthropomorphism can be seen as a useful starting point. This approach involves the critical use of human experience to recognise and alleviate animal suffering by combining one’s perception of a particular animal’s situation with what can be determined by more objective, science-based observations.6 We now examine in more detail whether such an approach can be successful.
Footnotes2 Thomas D (2005) Laboratory animals and the art of empathy J Med Ethics 31: 197–202.
3 See Nagel’s article, ‘What is it like to be a bat’, for a more detailed philosophical discussion regarding the differences between
first-person (experiential) data and third-person (quantifiable, scientific) data. Nagel T (1974) What is it like to be a bat The
Philos Rev 83: 435–50.
4 It could be assumed here that, philosophically, the assessment of mental states in other humans is always straightforward,
and that only animal states pose problems. However, this is not the case and there is intense debate about questions such as
whether it will ever be possible for a person to know what another person’s pain feels like, and whether they see the same
hues of colours as we do. See, for example, Tye M (2003) Qualia, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/.
Accessed on: 25 Apr 2005; Dennet D (1990) Quining Qualia, in Mind and Cognition, Lycan WC (Editor) (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers), pp519-48, available at: http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm. Accessed on: 25 Apr 2005. Thus,
although we can generally make successful predictions about the mental states of other human beings it should not be
forgotten that even such extrapolations may have their limitations.
5 In using terms such as pain or suffering, a wide spectrum of further connotations is often implied. In common-sense use,
synonyms for suffering include affliction, distress, pain, agony, misery, torment, anguish, grief, sorrow, calamity, misfortune,
trouble and adversity. When we say that someone suffers we also think of synonyms such as bear, abide, endure, lump,
stand, stomach, swallow, take and tolerate. We use these terms primarily to describe states in ourselves and other humans.
Care is required in applying them to animals, as it cannot be assumed that the terms always retain their meaning.
6 See Morton DB, Burghardt G and Smith JA (1990) Critical anthropomorphism, animal suffering and the ecological context
Hastings Center Report on Animals, Science and Ethics 20: 13–9.