Ethics of Research involving animals
Summary of paragraphs 4.3–4.28
4.29 In conclusion, it is extremely difficult to determine exactly the subjective experiences of animals in relation to pain and suffering. However, the evolutionary continuum that is obvious from physiological, neurological and behavioural similarities between humans, primates and other animals allows us to make meaningful approximations. While we need to ensure that applying terms such as pain and suffering to animals does not lead to undue anthropomorphism, their vagueness does not render them inapplicable or useless. It is also important to consider the fact that animals may experience negative welfare from circumstances that would not be sources of harm for humans. Awareness of behavioural and physiological species-specific needs to identify and assess deviations from that state is therefore essential. While assessment of animals’ behavioural and physiological responses to resources and environmental conditions is primarily a matter of empirical research and relatively straightforward, interpretation of the welfare implications for laboratory environments can be more complicated.
4.30 In the spirit of critical anthropomorphism, a combination of the evaluation of clinical signs, the study of animal choices, familiarity with ethological and ecological data, and consideration of physiological and neurological features can all allow for useful predictions of animals’ requirements and assessments of well-being, based on sound scientific evidence and processes. In this context, two respondents to the Consultation commented as follows:
‘It may well be that we can make significant improvements to the well-being of lab animals by making relatively simple modifications to standard husbandry practice. However, it is important not to be too anthropomorphic about what we conceive as quality of life for other animals, and what we do should be informed by more research into animal behaviour and cognition.’
Professor Julian Blow
‘Many schemes are available for scoring welfare and/or suffering in laboratory animals, and they can undoubtedly be useful. However, what is really needed is a commonsense approach. Nobody who has lived with dogs and cats can fail to know when they are suffering, whether or not we could quantify it or describe it perfectly. We must not let those who want to apply experimental procedures to animals get away with clever and pseudoscientific arguments about animal consciousness, ability to perceive pain, etc., as a means of escaping the need to justify what they want to do.’
Professor Michael Balls, Chairman of the FRAME Trustees
We conclude that judgements based on scientific evidence, and those based on empathy must be taken into consideration in assessments of animal welfare. Undue anthropomorphism, and the viewing of animals as mere research tools are equally inappropriate. We return to the ethical arguments about animal research in Chapters 14 and 15 and now consider more specific aspects relating to possible sources of suffering of laboratory animals.
24 Dudai Y, Jan YN, Byers D et al. (1976) A mutant of Drosophila deficient in learning Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 73: 1684–8.
25 The Animal Procedure Committee (APC) recommended that the common octopus be brought into the A(SP)A in 1992. The
Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act (Amendment) Order (1993) brought this change into effect. In 2001, the Committee
recommended that all cephalopods should be included in the Act as the addition of only one species, Octopus vulgaris,
appeared to be anomalous. See APC (2002) Minutes from APC meeting, February 2002, available at:
http://www.apc.gov.uk/reference/feb02.htm. Accessed on: 26 Oct 2004. As yet, no other invertebrate species have been
included in the A(SP)A.
26 See APC (2002) Minutes from APC meeting, February 2002, available at: http://www.apc.gov.uk/reference/feb02.htm.
Accessed on: 26 Oct 2004. For further information see Hanlon RT and Messenger JB (1996) Cephalopod Behaviour
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
27 Note that it would be fallacious to infer from this argument about the possibility of conscious experience in animals with very different neurological and physiological features, that there must be a range of animals which certainly possess such experiences. On the basis of an ethical ‘precautionary approach’ it might be tempting to err on the safe side and assume that this is the case. However, a representationalist and functional analysis of conscious experience shows that, among other things, beings capable of conscious suffering would require an integrated self-model (in order to develop a sense of ownership for the represented pain, fear or distress), representation of time (in order to possess a psychological moment, an experimental ‘now’), working memory and most probably the capacity for emotions (in order to represent negative value, at least in an non-conceptual manner). See Metzinger T (2003) Being No One – The self-model theory of subjectivity (Boston:
MIT), Chapter 3.