Ethics of Research involving animals
Discussion: four views on animal research - continuation I
The value of research
14.26 Insofar as the benefits cannot be obtained by any other means, proponents of the ’on balance justification’ view usually emphasise the importance of the benefits derived from pharmaceutical and toxicological research, and possibly also the value of results produced in the context of basic and applied biological and medical sciences (see also Chapters 5–9). However, some assert that a reasonable likelihood of success, in terms of a useful application of research, must be given for any experiment to be justified, particularly if it is likely to adversely affect the welfare of the research animals. Others disagree with this requirement and refer to the ‘jigsaw puzzle’ of science, in which almost any new research project contributes to valuable knowledge (paragraph 3.53). Nevertheless, both positions can agree that research for trivial purposes, such as the testing of new cosmetics, or of new household cleaners that differ insignificantly from already marketed products, is not justifiable.
The role of the Three Rs
14.27 The ’on balance justification’ view is sympathetic towards all Three Rs provided the current level of basic and applied scientific research can be maintained, and future progress is not hindered. Possible conflicts between implementing any of the Three Rs and delaying scientific progress would usually be resolved in the interest of scientific development. With regard to Replacements, proponents note that there will always be some areas in which animal research cannot be replaced. For example, researchers studying animal behaviour such as bird flight or song will clearly not be able to undertake this research on humans. In other areas, pragmatic and ethical concerns are likely to make it impossible to replace the use of animals with humans. For example, they would argue that it would neither be practically feasible, nor ethically acceptable, to produce inbred strains of humans for genetic knock-out studies (see Chapter 7).
The ‘moral dilemma’ view
Justification for using animals in research
14.28 According to this view, most research usually poses profound ethical dilemmas, as a decision is required between two alternatives, both of which are equally morally problematic. The current scientific approach requires animals that are viewed as moral subjects to be involved in harmful research, in order to comply with the moral imperative of preventing and alleviating human suffering. However, this approach is ethically challenging to the ‘moral dilemma’ view, since an inclusive conception of morality regards animals as moral subjects. At the same time, if animals were not used in potentially harmful research it would be far more difficult to comply with the duty of preventing and alleviating human suffering.
14.29 An important aspect of the ‘moral dilemma’ view is the fact that, to some degree, the dilemma is caused by historical circumstances. For example, the present population of adults in the UK lives in an environment in which currently available products and treatments have set a benchmark for medical standards and scientific progress. Many of these products have involved animal experimentation at some stage in their research and development. The current population did not ask for the research to be undertaken, but has become used to it and benefited from its results in many ways. Accordingly, although ethical concern for the welfare of animals would demand that at least some types of research should be given up, this is difficult, because most members of society would not be prepared merely to maintain, or even to slow down, the current scientific level of research in the biomedical sciences. The moral dilemma might never have occurred if, hypothetically, humans had never begun to experiment on animals, had had a far more restrictive policy in place or had found different ways to gain scientific knowledge.
14.30 It could be argued that the ‘moral dilemma’ view differs insignificantly from the ’on balance justification’ view: it is simply a stronger recognition of the fact that it is morally problematic to use other species. While this may be true for some positions within the concept, it may not be for other positions. These differ with regard to the way in which the relationship between humans and animals is understood; the way in which they may be used; views about the value of research; and the role of alternatives.
14.31 Proponents of the ‘moral dilemma’ view are less certain than those holding the ’on balance justification’ view about the supremacy of humans over animals. There can be various reasons for this difference. Usually, interpretations of religious approaches or evolutionary theory which suggest a clear primacy of humans over animals are rejected as they could equally be used to argue for stewardship and compassion (see also paragraphs 3.21, 3.24 and 3.27–3.50). Rather, proponents may draw on religious arguments that recognise human stewardship over animals,8 or they assert that it is reasonable to assume that animals become members of the moral community insofar as they possess one or more of the morally relevant capacities discussed in Chapter 3 (paragraphs 3.27–3.50). Whereas within the ’on balance justification’ view there is usually acceptance of a hierarchy of species based on the aggregate number of morally relevant capacities within the ‘moral dilemma’ view a more commonly found position is that there is no such hierarchy.
14.32 Similarly, whereas those holding the ’on balance justification’ view perceive forced consequentialist sacrifice as practised under the A(SP)A as acceptable because they take the view that it matters less to the animals themselves whether or not they are used in research, some proponents of the ‘moral dilemma’ view disagree. The reason for scepticism can be called epistemic modesty: most proponents of the ’on balance justification’ view assert that it is usually possible to assess levels of pain, suffering and distress in scientifically reliable ways.
Some of those holding the ‘moral dilemma’ view are more cautious. They refer to philosophical problems resulting from the ‘problem of other minds’, which casts doubt over the possibility of determining the exact state of consciousness of other beings (paragraphs 4.5 and 4.22). Since skilful observation, free from inappropriate anthropomorphisms, strongly suggests that animals do possess a range of different welfare states, one should, where possible, err on the safe side and refrain from any harmful use. Similarly, one should not assume that just because an animal such as a mouse is not in possession of higher mental capacities it is therefore more acceptable to subject it to pain: as may also be acknowledged under the ’on balance justification’ view, the quality of the pain and suffering may have a far greater intensity, despite, or rather because of, the lack of higher capacities (paragraphs 3.29 and 4.17).
14.33 In conclusion, from the ‘moral dilemma’ view, the primary motivation for granting animals intrinsic moral status is their possession of any of the morally relevant features. Expanding the discussion of the morally relevant criterion of sociability, proponents emphasise the importance of what can be termed relationship morality: humans can build meaningful relationships not only with other humans, but also with animals. The way specific areas of wellbeing are influenced by human action matters equally in both cases, since both are subjects of life (see Box 3.4) who have interests in maximising their welfare. Disrespecting the prima facie entitlement of animals to lead a life free from negative interference by humans can therefore create an existential dilemma for proponents of this position.
14.34 The question remains as to why humans should be able to use animals for harmful research. Proponents of the ‘moral dilemma’ view simply acknowledge that an uncontroversial justification cannot be obtained. Others may refer to the solidaristic preference argument (see paragraph 14.13), observing that while humans have difficulties in assessing the exact welfare-related states of animals, they have far fewer difficulties in assessing mental states relating to pain, suffering and distress in other humans. This capacity for empathy, together with the familiarity of suffering from one’s own experience, leads to strong desires to help alleviate, and where possible prevent, suffering in fellow humans, even if this is at the expense of disregard for the interests of some animals.
Using animals in research and in other contexts
14.35 It is difficult to predict what kind of research would be acceptable according to this view. The following aims to provide an outline of types of research that proponents of the view could accept. In many cases the ‘moral dilemma’ view might be more restrictive than the ’on balance justification’ view in permitting harmful research (provided the goals are comparable). But in some areas it also appears to allow for an extension. Whereas according to the ’on balance justification’ view research on the great apes, such as chimpanzees, is usually prohibited, within the ‘moral dilemma’ view this need not be the case. For example, the role of chimpanzees in the development of a test to identify hepatitis C-contaminated blood and blood products had a major impact on decreasing human morbidity and mortality (paragraph 6.25). Such research would not currently be permissible in the UK. However, under the ‘moral dilemma’ view it could, in principle, be acceptable, albeit with grave regret.
14.36 With regard to other uses of animals, holders of the ‘moral dilemma’ view are most often reluctant to accept them: insofar as other practices involve avoidable degrees of pain, suffering and distress, which are not to the benefit of the animal involved, the use is not ethically acceptable. Since proponents of the approach can also be understood to be sceptical as to how far humans will ever be able to understand what it is like to be another species, they would usually seek to avoid the use of animals for purposes such as the production of food and clothing, and sport and entertainment, particularly since in most Western societies alternatives to the same goals are readily available.
The value of research
14.37 The moral dilemma results from the fact that a valuable good such as the development of a medicine for a severe disease for one type of moral subject (i.e. humans) conflicts with a valuable good of another moral subject (i.e. that of an animal), usually its welfare or life. This means that no conflicts need exist when the human good is comparatively trivial. Cases of trivial goods that should not be developed would include new household cleaners that are similar in all relevant qualities to a number of other already available products, or analogous cases. Similarly, the approach would require that robust mechanisms be put in place to avoid the duplication of research, be it in the academic or commercial context. This is especially important with regard to the production of GM animals and cloning, as these procedures use relatively large numbers of animals, and, in some cases, may have unpredictable implications for welfare (paragraph 4.57).
14.38 Since proponents of the ‘moral dilemma’ view are very concerned about possible welfare infringements and accept them only in cases where a substantial benefit is to be expected, the question of basic research poses difficulties for the approach. On the ’on balance justification’ view, a wide range of basic research can be permissible. But on the ‘moral dilemma’ view the likelihood for any useful application to arise from knowledge gained in basic research will need to be considered carefully. Many proponents argue that if results
from basic research are unlikely to ever contribute to any practical application, the research would not be permissible, unless the welfare infringements are very minimal.
The role of the Three Rs
14.39 Due to the existential nature of the conflict, the moral dilemma is a situation that moral agents will seek to avoid as far as possible. Since they wish to protect the goods of both animals and humans, there is a great urgency to implement the Three Rs, with particular emphasis on Replacements. Just as proponents of the approach urge those wishing to undertake research on animals to justify its necessity clearly, they urge that every effort be made to ensure that the potential of alternatives is exhausted as far as possible.
14.40 They therefore welcome the provision of the A(SP)A, according to which animals can only be used for research if there is no other way of obtaining the information. However, they also argue that in order for this requirement to carry ethical weight (in the sense that the use of animals is therefore more acceptable), genuine efforts must be made to develop replacements, and to overcome the obstacles to their development and implementation (paragraph 3.63 and Chapter 11). Similarly, there is a strong obligation on those using animals in the commercial sector. For example, the view can be taken that not all products developed by the pharmaceutical industry justify the resolution of the moral conflict between the interests of animals and humans in favour of the latter. Companies operate in competitive environments, in which the primary aim is to generate profits, by focusing on those interventions that generate the highest returns. These products are not always those that are most needed (paragraphs 3.13, 8.7 and 15.83). Whereas, from the ’on balance justification’ viewpoint, there was no reason to object to this modus operandi in principle, here it can be argued that such interventions are only justified if they do not involve harmful research on animals next page
Footnotes8 However, see footnote 3.