Ethics of Research involving animals
Public policy in the context of moral disagreement
14.53 It is clear, then, that great moral disagreement exists both within and outside the Working Party. Nevertheless, as in other areas of ethically contentious issues, such as abortion or euthanasia, any society needs to settle on a single policy for practical purposes. Thus steps need to be taken to reduce existing disagreement as far as possible. At the very least, if a public policy is adopted which many believe to be morally wrong, instability, protest and, in extreme cases civil unrest may ensue. In thinking through the next stage in the argument we are partially influenced by the concept of the ‘overlapping consensus’, developed by the American philosopher John Rawls, who considered how to achieve fair agreements between reasonable moral agents on policies and procedures in societies that faced the ‘fact of pluralism’.12 The concept relies on the possibility that each party to a consensus supports it for its own sake, or on its own merits, based on its individual moral or other normative framework.13
14.54 In trying to achieve an overlapping consensus it is necessary to produce a procedure or position that could be adopted from all reasonable perspectives. Could it be the case that the concept of the Three Rs, and the type of hybrid moral position (some absolute constraints, some balancing), which can be said to underlie the A(SP)A, could be accepted, at least in broad outlines, by all positions? This is clearly so for the cluster of moral positions that support the ’on balance justification’ view, which directly endorses such a regime. The ‘moral dilemma’ approach suggests that there are no decisive moral considerations, and so may, for practical purposes, be prepared to fall in line with the ’on balance justification’ view, as long as the research is genuinely necessary, and no alternatives exist. The ‘weakness of morality’ view as a sub-category of the ‘abolitionist’ view cannot accept that there is a moral justification for present practices, but at the same time does not see morality as having influence on behaviour in any relevant sense. Its proponents, too, can accept something akin to the current regulations as a practical solution. Hence between these three views a form of overlapping consensus can be achieved.
14.55 However, whereas the ’anything goes’ view can accept the permissions included in the current regulations, it cannot accept the restrictions. The position for the abolitionists is the converse: they can accept the restrictions but not the permissions. As these moral positions appear to fall outside this overlapping consensus they require special discussion.
14.56 Although it is, as we have said, unlikely that any serious thinker holds the view that human beings may do whatever they like to animals without any moral justification, nevertheless there are groups who view some current restrictions as unjustified. Could anything be done to bring such groups into the overlapping consensus? The place in which their disagreement is greatest concerns cases such as the policy of the de facto ban on using the great apes. Proponents of the ’anything goes’ view argue that when there is a very good chance of providing positive results, of potential value to human health and life, then some forms of research on great apes should be permitted. The circumstances in which this would be permissible, and the forms of permissible treatment of such animals, would be very tightly controlled, to a point where, in practice, it may be very rare indeed that the conditions are met. As observed above, the current ‘ban’ merely has the status of policy, and is not enshrined directly in the A(SP)A (paragraphs 13.6 and 13.30). Thus, in principle, some of the proponents of the ’anything goes’ view might join the overlapping consensus, as long as the prohibition is not a matter of law.
14.57 The abolitionists, by contrast, would prefer the policy decision to be a matter of law, rather than policy. They welcome the restrictions in current regulations, yet view the permissions as unacceptable. Widening the permissions would make matters worse for them. The argument for this is, as we have seen, either that it is wrong to take the life of an animal or that it is wrong to impose suffering on one being for the sake of another. This argument is also accepted by those who hold the ‘weakness of morality’ position and the ‘moral dilemma’ argument, and hence is accepted by a broader group than the abolitionists. There is therefore also a consensus between these three groups on the immorality of research involving animals. Only the abolitionists believe that it provides a decisive reason for ending harmful research upon animals.
14.58 Yet, it would be imprudent to abandon the project of trying to draw more people sharing the abolitionists’ view into the overlapping consensus. This would, of course, mean introducing more restrictions. Some restrictions might easily suggest themselves; for example, those where animals are being used to develop consumer products with relatively trivial consumer or health benefit, to produce products which differ little from those already on the market, where research is being duplicated or where alternative methods could be developed if there was a political will to do so. Hence by being clearer about the circumstances in which research involving animals is permitted, there is some chance of creating an overlapping consensus which would gain broader, albeit not universal, approval.
14.59 In sum, the way to try to draw more people into the broad consensus is to examine cases where restrictions may seem to rule out very significant research, and cases where permissions allow relatively trivial work. By fine-tuning the regulations, relaxing some restrictions and introducing others, a broader group of people could give a greater endorsement to the regulations than has been possible before now, even if no one set of regulations would be considered fully acceptable by all.
14.60 In aiming to include the ‘abolitionist’ and the ‘anything goes’ views in the overlapping consensus it has also become clear that their willingness to adhere to the consensus differs somewhat from the ‘on balance justification’, the ‘moral dilemma’ and the ‘weakness of morality’ views. Whereas the latter three views are able to genuinely share a consensus, the former two appear at best to be able to accept the approach of the Three Rs and the provisions and practise of the A(SP)A under given current circumstances as a compromise. Thus, it would seem wrong to suggest that there can be substantive consensus (i.e. consensus on a shared view about which research can be viewed as justified), although it seems correct to say that in view of the current situation an enlarged procedural consensus is achievable (i.e. consensus that a certain system of licensing and control of animal research is tolerable or acceptable).
14.61 This distinction is important for two reasons. First, because policy should not be guided by what in effect may simply be the lowest common denominator. Rather, as we have said, we recognise that there are a number of competing moral outlooks on animal research, which need to be considered in shaping policy that is defensible and reasonable, and with which as many members of the public as possible can agree. Too often, the polarised character of the debate has obscured potential areas of genuine agreement, and it is crucial to examine, as far as possible, its potential scope.
14.62 Secondly, although full substantive consensus may be unattainable, we conclude that there is genuine overlapping consensus in terms of process. Even if proponents of the ’anything goes’ view and the ‘abolitionist’ view differ on the letter of the law of the A(SP)A, current government policy and how these are implemented, most reasonable proponents of both views are likely to accept that for as long as animal research continues, animals involved must be protected. It can be argued that in these circumstances a detailed system of licensing and inspection is a necessary and legitimate instrument to reconcile the different views that stakeholders and members of society hold.
14.63 If this approach is to count as a fair process, several conditions need to be met. First, all involved need to be able to have access to relevant information about animal research, such as the goals, welfare implications and alternatives to research, in order to judge whether specific types of research and mechanisms to regulate them are justifiable with regard to their normative frameworks. Secondly, the discussion about appropriate policies must be conducted in a fair and informed manner, which permits all reasonable participants to argue their case. In this context, specific forms of protest that involve militant protests and violence are highly damaging and erode the necessary climate for reasoned debate. Thirdly, there must be a genuine possibility for policies to be readjusted if the consensus shifts. Fourthly, in order to do so there must be reliable evidence on the views of all stakeholders as to whether they can support the status quo, and any future developments. Thus, only if these conditions are met can it be argued that the A(SP)A, which represents a hybrid framework combining deontological and consequentialist elements (see paragraphs 3.58–3.62), is justified as, in practice, it could be endorsed by the vast majority of members of the pluralist UK society.14 We present further discussion on more detailed aspects of improving policy and the climate of debate about animal research in the next chapter.
Footnotes12 Rawls J (1987) The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus Oxford Journal for Legal Studies 7: 1-25.
13 Rawls J (1989) The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus New York University Law Review 64: 233–55.
14 Similar approaches can be found in other areas of bioethics-related policy: for example, although people in the UK have a prima facie right to confidentiality, this right can be infringed in cases where it is in the public interest, since it is accepted practice that medical records can be accessed without prior consent in the case of criminal investigations.