Nuffield Council on Bioethics / Home

Ethics of Research involving animals

Ethical issues - continuation II

Assessing pain, suffering and distress

Since the nature of any pain, suffering or distress that an animal might experience in scientific uses is crucial to assessing the ethical implications of research involving animals, we focus in Chapter 4 on the capacity of animals to experience such states, and on philosophical and practical problems in making such assessments.

We conclude that although philosophically it is extremely difficult to determine exactly the subjective experiences of animals, practically it is often straightforward to make meaningful approximations. The evaluation of clinical signs, the study of animal choices, familiarity with ethological and ecological data, and consideration of physiological and neurological features are all important (paragraphs 4.18–4.28). In the spirit of critical anthropomorphism therefore, consideration of scientific evidence, especially in relation to species-specific needs of animals, can be combined fruitfully with familiarity, empathy and methodological observation (paragraph 4.7 and 4.29–4.30). Nonetheless, care needs to be taken to avoid unwarranted anthropomorphism in applying terms such as pain, suffering and distress, which we use successfully in human–human interactions, to animals (paragraph 4.60).

In practice, the welfare implications for animals involved in research and testing vary greatly. Whether or not animals experience pain suffering and distress, either as a result of experimental procedures or in the wider context through breeding, transport or housing, depends on a number of factors. These include the nature of the experiment and the likely adverse effects that it may entail, standards of handling and husbandry, and the skills and motivation of those handling the animals to implement Refinements, such as in the use of pain relieving medicines or the provision of enrichments. While it is therefore impossible to generalise about the way animals are affected by research, we make some observations on the kind of factors that influence animal welfare in paragraphs 4.31–4.59. This information needs to be considered in relation to the specific uses of animals in different types of research, which are described in Chapters 5–9.

Moral agency and the role of regulation

We explore the question of what it means to be a moral agent. This concept is important in deciding what it is to be a morally responsible scientist or animal technician, and also what the role of regulation should be in generating an appropriate environment (paragraphs 3.69–3.77).
We contrast two views:

• that to be a moral agent is a matter of following a set of rules or principles; and

• that the requirements of moral agency cannot be formulated in terms of a precise set of principles, but rather requires cultivating a certain set of dispositions of character, usually called virtues.

We conclude that some form of regulation is necessary for good moral practice, but that it is crucial to be aware that it may not be sufficient (paragraph 3.77).

The views of the members of the Working Party

There is no consensus within the Working Party as to whether one of the morally relevant features is a master property, nor whether a consequentialist, a deontological or a hybrid approach is the most
appropriate framework for deciding whether or not a specific, or any, type of research is acceptable.
The Working Party has therefore not been able to agree on a single ethical stance. Instead, we present an outline of four possible ethical positions that can be taken, which mark positions on a continuum:

• The ‘anything goes’ view (paragraphs 14.16–14.20)
  If humans see value in research involving animals, then it requires no further ethical justification (no member of the Working Party takes this position).

• The ‘on balance justification’ view (paragraphs 14.2–14.27)
  In accepting research involving animals one acts with full moral justification, while accepting that every reasonable step must be taken to reduce the costs that fall on animals.

• The ‘moral dilemma’ view (paragraphs 14.28–14.40)

Most forms of research involving animals pose moral dilemmas: however one decides to act, one acts wrongly, either by neglecting human health and welfare or by harming animals.

• The ‘abolitionist’ view (paragraphs 14.41–14.52)

There is no moral justification for any harmful research on sentient animals that is not to their benefit. Humans experiment on animals not because it is right but because they can (the weakness of morality’ view, as a sub-category of the abolitionist view, is considered in paragraphs 14.52).

For each position we describe (i) the justification for using animals in research, (ii) the implications for using animals in research and in other contexts, (iii) the value attributed to research and (iv) the role of the Three Rs. The reader is invited to judge whether one or other of the positions is superior to others. In presenting them, we are clear that moral frameworks are not to be acquired and maintained in a simple ‘pick and choose’ fashion. Rather, they require continuous scrutiny and justification (paragraph 14.10).
Furthermore, all members agree that independently of morally relevant features such as sentience, higher cognitive capacities, capability for flourishing and sociability, the acceptance of even relatively mild experiments for great benefit depends on the acceptance of two vital moral assumptions: that the life of laboratory animals such as mice does not have absolute value; and that forced consequentialist sacrifice is acceptable. (By the latter term we mean to say that one is able to justify a morally unequal distribution of costs and benefits among different beings.)
There is no consensus within the Working Party as to whether these assumptions are morally acceptable. However, all members do agree with the conditional: harmful research involving animals must be morally unacceptable if animal life is seen as having absolute value, or if forced consequentialist sacrifice is always seen as wrong (paragraph 14.6).

Public policy in the context of moral disagreement

As in the case of other ethically contentious issues, such as abortion or euthanasia, any society needs to settle on a single policy for practical purposes. Steps need to be taken to reduce as far as possible existing disagreement. At the very least, if a public policy is adopted that many believe to be morally wrong, it may lead to instability, protest and, in extreme cases, civil unrest.

We consider that the concept of the Three Rs, and the type of hybrid moral position underlying the A(SP)A (some absolute constraints, some balancing) could be accepted, or at least tolerated, by all those holding reasonable views. Clearly, neither the Three Rs nor the A(SP)A command universal respect, and hence it would be wrong to claim that these approaches could be supported fully from the positions included in the spectrum set out above. For example, abolitionists will not agree to any invasive research involving sentient animals, and hence will not be able to genuinely share a consensus permitting it under certain conditions. However, they may, in principle, be able to tolerate the approach of the Three Rs and the provisions of the A(SP)A as a compromise, while continuing to campaign for a change in policy. Thus, although it would be wrong to suggest that there can be a substantive consensus (i.e. consensus on a shared view that research can be viewed as justified), it seems right to say that in view of the current situation an enlarged procedural consensus is achievable (i.e. consensus that certain democratic procedures are justified, such as a system of licensing and control of animal research that is deemed necessary). By fine tuning the regulations, relaxing some restrictions and introducing others, a broader group of people could give a greater endorsement to the form and content of the regulations than has been the case so far, even if no one set of regulations would be considered fully acceptable by all (paragraph 14.59). If this approach is to count as a fair process, several conditions need to be met.

• All involved need to be able to have access to relevant information about research involving animals, such as the goals, welfare implications and alternatives to research, in order to judge whether specific types of research are justifiable in respect of their normative frameworks.

• The discussion about appropriate policies must be conducted in a fair and informed manner, which permits all reasonable participants to argue their case. The use of violence and intimidation are highly damaging to this process and are unacceptable, as they erode the necessary climate for reasoned debate.

• There must be a genuine possibility for policies to be readjusted. For this to be achieved, there must be reliable evidence about the views of members of the public so as to judge whether specific policies need to be revised (paragraph 14.63)