Ethics of Research involving animals
Summary: four views on the ethics of animal research
The ‘anything goes’ view
From this viewpoint, if humans see value in research involving animals, then it requires no further ethical justification. It is overly regulated and the primary reasons for implementing the Three Rs are economic or scientific necessity. This position marks one end of the spectrum,2 and is not held by any members of the Working Party.
The ‘on balance justification’ view
Here it is argued that although research involving animals has costs to animals, which must be taken seriously in moral reasoning, the benefits to human beings very often outweigh those costs in moral terms. Hence it is argued that in accepting research involving animals one acts with full moral justification, while accepting that every reasonable step must be taken to reduce the costs that fall on animals, and that some forms of research are not justified. The ‘moral dilemma’ view From this viewpoint it is argued that most forms of research involving animals pose moral dilemmas: according to the current scientific approach the use of animals is necessary to comply with the moral imperative to cure human disease and to save human lives. This also means that animals are treated in ways which are morally wrong. Accordingly, however one decides to act, one acts wrongly, either by neglecting human health or by harming animals. Both alternatives cause severe regret to moral agents, and there is no justification either in principle or in general for conducting, or neglecting to conduct, research involving animals. In order to prevent further dilemmas, the implementation of the Three Rs, particularly of Replacements, must be a priority.
The ‘abolitionist’ view
According to this view, humans experiment on animals not because it is right but because they can. Since any research that causes pain, suffering and distress is wrong, there is no moral justification for harmful research on sentient animals that is not to the benefit of the animal concerned. The greater the impact on the animal’s welfare, the more objectionable the research. This is seen as valid irrespective of any possible scientific, medical or other benefit. Since humans should not act in morally objectionable ways, every effort must be made to bring an end to all animal research as soon as possible. A view that is related to the ‘abolitionist’ view, but which is not considered in the same detail as the other four views above, can be called the ‘weakness of morality’ view. Proponents of this perspective agree with the abolitionists that from a moral point of view it is simply wrong to use animals for any human purposes that compromise their welfare in ways that are not in their interests. Despite this belief, holders of this view find that they are not motivated to act on it, for example by campaigning for the abolition of all research involving sentient animals.
Footnotes2 More accurately, the spectrum might be constructed as follows: (i) humans are morally required to carry out any kind of animal
research they deem desirable; (ii) humans are morally permitted to carry out (specific types of) animal research; (iii) humans are
morally prohibited to carry out any type of animal research. The ‘anything goes’ view falls primarily in category (i), the ‘on
balance justification’ and the ‘moral dilemma’ views belong primarily in (ii) and the ‘abolitionist’ view in category (iii). The
spectrum presented here does not begin with what might be conceived of as the most ‘liberal’ view, since the ‘anything goes’
view is characterised by stating that ‘research requires no further ethical justification’, and it is therefore relatively close to
category (ii). The reason for this structure is that the Working Party found it difficult to consider in isolation a view according to which humans were required to carry out any type of animal research. While all members agreed that there were wellgrounded moral reasons that require humans to undertake research, it is less straightforward to conceive of good arguments that would support the argument that humans are required to carry out any research specifically requiring the use of animals. Thus, while such a position is conceptually possible, in practice it is difficult to construe. Moreover, arguments according to which humans are morally required to undertake specific types of animal research are found in the ‘anything goes’, the ‘on balance justification’ and the ‘moral dilemma’ views. Therefore, although the logical (liberal) end of the spectrum is not represented here, different versions of the more practical argument according to which humans are morally required to use animals in certain circumstances are. We hope that the discussion of the tension between these moral requirements, and the concerns that may arise in deliberations about their pursuit, are useful.