Ethics of Research involving animals
Discussion: four views on animal research - continuation II
The ‘abolitionist’ view
Justification for using animals in research
14.41 According to this view, there is no justification for any harmful research on sentient animals that is not to the benefit of the animal concerned. This is valid irrespective of any possible scientific, medical or other benefit. Since humans should not act in morally objectionable ways, proponents argue that every effort must be made to bring an end to all research involving as soon as possible. Research on animals is viewed as unacceptable because any research constitutes forced consequentialist sacrifice which can come in two forms (see paragraph 15.5):
- First, animals can be used to produce results that benefit other animals. For example, research may seek to develop a vaccine for cattle. The animals directly involved in research are used without consent, which is impossible to obtain from animals. The research animals are hence forced to experience a range of negative welfare infringements for the benefit of other animals.
- Secondly, animals can be used in research undertaken for the benefit of humans. The examples provided in Chapters 5–9 show that the welfare implications of harmful research are diverse and include research such as toxicity testing and the use of animals as disease models, both of which may cause considerable suffering. The breeding, transportation and housing conditions will also affect the animal (see paragraphs 4.31–4.59).
14.42 From the abolitionist viewpoint, the justification that proponents of research involving animals provide, for logical reasons, cannot support their case. The fundamental question that abolitionists pose is why the moral capacity of an animal should count less than that
of a human. The question to be answered is therefore: why should the suffering of a mouse be morally less significant than the suffering of a human? The answer usually provided is that the human is more important. Most abolitionists are willing to concede that such
differences in status can justify unequal treatment in the case of competition for goods; for example, it could be argued that it is morally unproblematic for humans to prevent animals from eating the fruit of a tree by covering it with a net. However, abolitionists also argue that such difference in status cannot in itself justify the use of animals by humans for harmful research.
14.43 Similarly, abolitionists disagree with the argument that suffering experienced by animals is experienced in a lesser way than the suffering of humans. Quite plausibly, the nature of suffering differs between different species, but as is obvious from the discussion in Chapter 4, biological similarities, the responsible use of empathy9 and critical anthropomorphism emphasise the reality of animal suffering (paragraph 4.60). While, strictly speaking, it may be true that we will never really know ‘what is like to be a rat’ (see paragraph 4.5), in the absence of evidence about the different natures of suffering, humans should err on the side of caution and not make the assumption that animals suffer in a lesser way.10
14.44 According to the ‘abolitionist’ view, the main reasons why humans find it acceptable to use animals stem from societal conventions. Humans continue to use animals because they have always done so. In moral terms this conclusion can be called a genetic fallacy: the moral permissibility of actions does not follow simply from previously established practices. Rather, all actions need to be justified by reference to ethical theories. Since, on the ‘abolitionist’ view, all animals and humans capable of sentience have the same moral status, use of animals for research constitutes unjustified discrimination and illegitimate use of force by one member of the moral community against another. Such use of force that ultimately may bring about death is only justified in cases of emergencies, such as selfdefence. This circumstance does not apply in the case of commonly conducted harmful animal research. Thus, from the ‘abolitionist’ view, the current treatment of most animals in Western societies is adequately described as speciesist (see Box 3.4 and paragraph 4.13): the primary criterion that distinguishes animals from humans is their belonging to different species. However, on the ‘abolitionist’ view, this is a morally irrelevant criterion. It cannot justify differential treatment of humans and animals any more than different sex or race of humans can justify differential moral treatment.
Using animals in research and in other contexts
14.45 As in the ‘moral dilemma’ view, the ‘abolitionist’ view concludes that the consideration of the use of animals in research must lead to a re-evaluation of uses of animals in other contexts. Insofar as other practices involve avoidable degrees of pain, suffering and distress, which arise from a practice that is not to the benefit of the animal involved, other uses are not ethically acceptable. Consequently, they seek to avoid the harmful use of animals for purposes such as the production of food and clothing, or for sport and entertainment. More difficult cases may be raised by the issue of pest control. Most abolitionists would employ barrier methods of control that cause minimum stress and suffering to the animals concerned. Alternatively, they can decide to abstain from any control. Others may argue that temporary suffering, resulting for example from catching the animal and moving it to another environment, can be justified, provided that the new environment is comparable in quality to the previous one.
The value of research
14.46 The main concern of the ‘abolitionist’ view is the capacity of beings to suffer. Therefore, and in agreement with the previous three positions, research to alleviate suffering of humans and animals is imperative. But this imperative is constrained by the fact that research itself must not cause any suffering to beings unable to consent to such treatment. Therefore, proponents see research on voluntarily consenting humans, or Replacements such as in vitro research or computer studies (see Box 11.1), as the only ethically acceptable solutions. Abolitionists also frequently argue that a focus on research with human participants improves scientific practice, as it circumvents problems concerning predictability and transferability of scientific results from animals to humans (paragraph 10.27).
14.47 A possible problem for this approach is how to deal with the consequences of a scenario where all animal research was in fact abandoned. Would it be possible to maintain an equivalent level of basic and applied scientific knowledge without the use of animals in research? One response is to point to the potential of human creativity: throughout human history, an impressive range of inventions has been achieved, which have allowed humans to attain goals that were thought as categorically impossible in earlier periods. For example, few people would have believed a person in the mid-19th century who stated that it would one day be possible to fly to the moon. Put differently, the argument might also be presented in the form of a thought experiment: if a powerful alien race invaded Earth and demanded an end to all animal research, as otherwise all humans would be killed, would it not be likely that human creativity would very quickly develop a range of alternative methods to take the place of the previously practised animal experiments?
14.48 This paraphrase of the argument that ‘necessity is the mother of invention’ is also used to draw attention to the fact that achieving changes in policy is not always only a question of small incremental changes, but more often a matter of powerful incentives. Thus, proponents emphasise that radical changes are possible, as long as there is a political will at national and international levels to achieve a change. Recent developments such as bans on the use of animals for the testing of cosmetic products and their ingredients, alcohol or tobacco, and the policy decision not to grant licences for the use of the great apes in the UK, are also cited to support the argument that substantial change is possible.
14.49 All proponents need to consider another issue arising from the scenario of a sudden abandonment of animal research. It can plausibly be argued that the pace of most areas of research would slow down, and that the development of new medicines would be delayed, provided that, in principle, Replacements and studies on humans could fill the gap of animal research in the medium to long term. Many abolitionists respond by making reference to the ’historical contingency’ argument which featured in the ‘moral dilemma’ view (paragraph 14.29). Abolitionists note that present day generations simply ‘inherited’ animal research and its consequences without consent. They argue that irrespective of the costs for humans, the immediate cessation of animal research is ethically superior to a compromise solution, in which a ‘phase-out’ approach is sought, for example by introducing further restrictive policies. But some advocate instead the need of more direct action, for example in the form of freeing animals from research facilities. Others acknowledge pragmatic political and professional constraints, and conclude that the scenario of a sudden end to all animal research is highly unrealistic. Even if there was a political will to ban all such research, in view of the practical realities, the transition would inevitably be ‘soft’. Accordingly, from the ‘abolitionist’ view the proactive development of Replacements is crucial in achieving a smooth and quick transition.
14.50 We observed above that the development of these alternatives faces considerable scientific and non-scientific challenges (paragraphs 11.6–11.9 and 11.19). There is also one type of research that cannot be replaced. This concerns harmful studies to understand the basic biological processes, behaviour and evolution of animals for the sake of advancing knowledge. The problem here would be that this research cannot be undertaken on humans, since the goal is not to learn about the human, but about the animal organism. However, appropriately conducted non-harmful and purely observational research on animals in their natural environment could be permissible. While those taking the ‘abolitionist’ view are, in principle, concerned about any harmful use of animals that is not in their interest, many are particularly concerned about research in which animals are sacrificed for comparatively trivial benefits to humans, agreeing with the position discussed under the ‘moral dilemma’ view (paragraph 14.36).
The role of the Three Rs
14.51 Since on the ‘abolitionist’ view any forced consequentialist sacrifice is ethically unacceptable, strictly speaking the options of Refinement and Reduction strategies are not compatible with the approach.11 The focus is therefore usually on Replacements only, which need to be developed, validated and implemented as a matter of urgency.
The ‘weakness of morality’ view
14.52 At this point, we can briefly consider one last view, which can be seen as a sub-category of the ‘abolitionist’ view and can be called the ‘weakness of morality’ view. Proponents agree with the abolitionists that from a moral point of view it is simply wrong to use animals for any human purposes that compromise the welfare of animals in ways that are not in their interest. Despite this belief, they find that they are not motivated to act on it, just as many people think that, morally, they should give more money to charity, or cease eating meat, or act in a more environmentally friendly way, but never actually do so. In the case of research involving animals, such people believe that the benefits to humans, although improperly gained, overwhelm their moral qualms, which exist at the level of conscience only. Thus, they do not act on their belief that research involving animals is wrong, by boycotting products tested on animals or attempting to bring about social change by changing moral attitudes. Unlike the true abolitionists, they may even believe that, in general, moral advocacy is too weak a motivating force at the level of each individual human. However, they have greater hopes for structural change. From this viewpoint, implementation of all Three Rs, and particularly replacement strategies, holds out the hope that it may be possible to achieve scientific goals without being complicit in immoral behaviour, by making research involving animals unnecessary.
Footnotes9 Thomas D (2005) Laboratory animals and the art of empathy J Med Ethics 31: 197–202.
10 It is also possible to assume that the suffering of animals is actually experienced in a much more severe way than that of humans. For example where they do not have the possibility of ‘understanding why they suffer’, which can provide considerably relief in the case of humans.
11 Since the approach is primarily concerned with the avoidance of suffering de facto, the application of Refinement and Reduction could be viewed as steps towards the ultimate goals of replacement, especially insofar as they help to alleviate animal suffering. But this view is not shared by all of those taking the abolitionist position.