Ethics of Research involving animals
Ethical issues continuation I
Morally relevant features
We suggest instead that a promising approach is to ask what features of humans and animals can qualify them as moral subjects, imposing constraints or limits on how they may be treated. We do not start from the assumption that there is one ‘master property’ or overriding criterion. Nor, for the purpose of the discussion in Chapter 3, do we assume that there are some species that should never be used for any purpose, or that the acceptability of using species depends on how closely related they are to humans in evolutionary terms. We explore the possibility that there are no less than the following five morally relevant features. At least one, or all of these, may be applicable to specific animals, albeit to differing degrees, and with subtly distinct moral consequences:
- sentience (paragraphs 3.28–3.29);
- higher cognitive capacities (paragraphs 3.30–3.36);
- the capacity to flourish (paragraphs 3.37-3.43);
- sociability (paragraphs 3.44–3.46); and
- possession of a life (paragraphs 3.47–3.49);
Ways of considering morally relevant features in different normative frameworks
We then turn to the question of deciding how, with regard to the possible or certain benefits of research, such characteristics should be taken into account in moral decision making: through weighing of factors (for example, the degree of suffering experienced by animals versus the value of benefits of research) or through the generation of absolute prohibitions (for example, that no research should be undertaken on animals that are capable of higher cognitive capacities, such as the chimpanzees, regardless of the benefits; paragraphs 3.51 and 3.57). A consequentialist view weighs all costs against all benefits (paragraphs 3.52–3.55). A deontological view lays down particular prohibitions (paragraphs 3.56–3.57). A hybrid view contains some prohibitions and some weighing (paragraphs 3.58–3.61). Hybrid views appear to prevail in practice, both in UK regulations and in public attitudes.
Two questions are especially important in the context of hybrid views: first, what are the absolute constraints; and secondly, how are different morally relevant factors weighed within the permitted area? To answer these questions, we will always need to consider at least five questions (paragraph 14.3):
i) what are the goals of research?
ii) what is the probability of success?
iii) which animals are to be used?
iv) what effect will there be on the animals used in the experiment?
v) are there any alternatives?