Ethics of Research involving animals
Discussion of ethical issues
Introduction
14.1 In this chapter we resume the discussion about ethical issues raised by research involving animals. We also consider basic questions about how public policy should be shaped in this area where there is widespread disagreement among members of the UK population. In Chapter 3 we argued that the ethical question is best thought of not simply in terms of the relative moral status of humans and animals, but by consideration of two questions: first, what features of human and animals make them objects of moral concern; and second, how should those features be taken into account in moral reasoning: through weighing of factors or through the generation of absolute prohibitions?
14.2 We suggested that there are five features that have the potential to give rise to moral concern: sentience; higher cognitive capacities; capability for flourishing; sociability; and possession of a life (paragraphs 3.27–3.50). The last of these was the most controversial. We also explored how to consider these features in moral reasoning. A consequentialist view weighs all costs against all benefits (paragraphs 3.52–3.55). A deontological view lays down particular prohibitions (paragraphs 3.56–3.57). A hybrid view contains some prohibitions and some weighing (paragraphs 3.58–3.62). We also concluded that the ethical positions that coincide with the current UK regulations are hybrid (paragraph 3.58). It appears that, in practice, the positions of most people, except perhaps those of animal protection groups, are hybrid too, allowing some weighing of factors, and accepting absolute prohibitions in other areas.1
14.3 If we accept that most views are hybrid, then we can see that the debate comes down to disagreement on two questions: first, what are the absolute constraints? and secondly, how do we weigh different morally relevant factors within the permitted area? To answer these questions, we will always need to consider at least five questions:
i) what are the goals of research?
ii) what is the probability of success?
iii) which animals are to be used?
iv) what effect will there be on the animals used in the experiment?
v) are there any alternatives?
14.4 To bring the basic moral issues into sharp focus, we consider first, as a purely hypothetical example, an abstraction that might be considered by many people as a relatively uncontroversial type of animal experiment. We assume that the goal of the research is the saving of human life through the eradication of a widespread painful and debilitating childhood disease; that there is a high probability of success; that the experiments can be conducted on a small number of mice; that the animals will suffer only mild discomfort, although they will have shortened lives; and that no acceptable alternatives will be available in the foreseeable future however much effort we expend. What objections could there be, if all these conditions are met?
14.5 In considering the example it is important to be aware that it has been drawn up in such a way that the total benefits of the experiment (to humans) are in some sense greater than the total costs (to the animals). However, it is a further step towards the conclusion that the
presence of a positive total of benefits justifies the experiment ethically. There are at least two reasons why such a justification might be rejected:
- First, a number of mice will die. Some people argue that the value of any life is such that it would be wrong deliberately to take a life for any purpose, even for the saving of a greater number of human lives. This can be called the view that life has absolute value. Other people might assert that although the taking of a life has no absolute value, it still has intrinsic value in the sense that it would be wrong deliberately to take a life for any purpose without careful justification.
- Secondly, whether or not there is a value to life, it is clear that mice are being used for the sake of human beings. Even if one takes the view that human life is much more important than the comfort and lives of laboratory mice, and that the weighing of relevant factors clearly supports the experiment, nevertheless the laboratory animals suffer costs and do not accrue any benefits, while humans receive all the benefits. This problematic distribution of costs and benefits gives rise to the objection from forced consequentialist sacrifice. It is a notorious problem with any consequentialism that the costs may fall in one place and the benefits arise in another. In some cases, for example within a political society or an economic community, this asymmetry may even out over time so that those who suffer today may gain tomorrow, but clearly this is not the case with the individual animals used in laboratory experiments. Similarly, it is irrelevant to point out that sometimes animals benefit from animal research, for the animals which benefit are not the ones on which the experiments are conducted.
14.6 The importance of the last paragraph is that independently of morally relevant features such as sentience, higher cognitive capacities, capability for flourishing and sociability, the acceptance of even relatively mild experiments for great benefit depends on the acceptance of two vital moral assumptions: that the life of laboratory animals such as mice does not have absolute value; and that consequentialist sacrifice is acceptable. There is no consensus within the Working Party as to whether these assumptions are morally acceptable. But we do agree with the conditional: harmful research involving animals must be morally unacceptable if animal life is seen as having absolute value, or if forced consequentialist sacrifice is always seen as wrong.
14.7 There is, however, still much room for disagreement among those who deny that animal lives have absolute value and who accept at least some forced consequentialist sacrifice. Nonetheless, the Working Party has not been able to agree on a common ethical stance with regard to the conditions that have to be met for animal research to be justified. Instead, we offer below an outline of four possible positions that can be taken. These views should be understood as marking positions on a continuum.
14.8 As will become clear, members differ not only in their positions on what forms of animal research can be morally justified, but also in their views about the status of morality itself. That is, whether it is universal, absolute and discernible by reason; whether it is largely conventional, socially relative and invented by human beings, to be discovered by sociological research; or whether some other philosophical theory of morality is correct (see paragraphs 3.4–3.7). Consequently, in the following we do not provide a statement of the Working Party’s collective moral view, substantive or philosophical, which would be based on one single moral theory. Rather we aim to achieve a number of different goals, as follows:
- Our primary aim is to provide a clearer understanding of the range of moral views held on issues raised by animal research, both within the Working Party and outside, and of the reasons that people hold them. Too often the debate about animal research is presented in a very simplified and polarised manner, differentiating between ‘those opposed’ and ‘those in favour’. Our own discussions, and our analysis of responses to the Consultation, have indicated that such perceptions are overly simplistic and unhelpful in furthering fruitful debate.
- From a philosophical perspective, consideration of the range of different views is useful because they illustrate the complex structure of ethical justification. Like other areas of controversy in bioethics, the topic of research involving animals challenges us to test, and if necessary revise, our ethical framework in view of our considered judgements about specific areas of research (paragraph 3.7).
- Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, we also aim to clarify more precisely the scope of agreement and disagreement between different views, and the sources of disagreement. Such an exercise is helpful in reducing disagreement as far as possible, in order to identify an ethically based public policy, which, while it may not entirely accord with any particular moral framework, may be seen as reflecting a broad agreement that provides for the best accommodation of views that can be achieved under current conditions.
14.9 Before we present an outline of a range of ethical views, we need to make one further important observation. We have said that the Working Party does not take a view on the status of morality itself. Thus, it might be thought that the Working Party was content to agree with the following two statements.
- ‘All claims that are given a moral justification are equally valid, and hence all of the four views presented below are equally valid. Morality comes down to a matter of "picking and choosing".’
- ‘If there were a country in which all inhabitants agreed that there was nothing wrong with causing pain, suffering, distress or death to animals, then the matter would be entirely up to those people and they would not deserve moral criticism.’
14.10 The Working Party does not agree with either of these statements. With regard to the first, all members of the Working Party associate themselves with one (or more, depending on the context) of the views that we set out below. In holding their particular view, they are willing to defend their reasons and justifications for coming to particular conclusions, and they challenge others to do the same, in a calm and civilised manner. All members strive to achieve coherence between their considered judgments or intuitions about specific cases of animal research, the relationship to judgments about similar cases, and the principles, rules and theoretical considerations that govern them. Discussion of conflicts between these views provides welcome opportunity to engage in this process. The reader is invited to judge whether one or other of the positions is superior to others. However, in presenting them, we are clear there is no such thing as an 'off-the-shelf' morality. Moral frameworks are not acquired and maintained in a simple ‘pick-and-choose’ fashion. Rather, they require continuous scrutiny and justification.
14.11 With regard to the question of whether or not people of a country that showed no concern for any animals deserved moral criticism, all members of the Working Party agree that this would be so. No member takes the view that complete disregard for the five morally relevant features – sentience, higher cognitive capacities, capability for flourishing, sociability and the value of life – can be ethically justified. In this sense all members agree that the purposeless infliction of pain, suffering, distress or death to animals is a universal moral wrong. However, we disagree about the reasons for reaching this conclusion (paragraphs 3.7 and 14.8).
14.12 We consider the relation of ethical theory to public policy in more detail below (paragraph 14.53-14.63) and now turn to the four possible stances on animal research. Presenting four views rather than one may be disappointing to some. Nevertheless we believe that it is the most appropriate way of taking the complexity of the debate seriously, and providing guidance to those wishing to engage in thorough ethical analysis.
Footnotes1 Even some of those opposed in general to animal research may allow that some research involving animals is permissible; for example non-harmful observation of animals in their natural habitat for the purpose of conservation, and possibly mildly harmful research that entails tagging or ringing of animals.