Ethics of Research involving animals
Ethics of Research involving animals - continuation I
characterise this subject, we think it important to draw attention to two fundamental issues relevant to our discussion.
3.6 First, the relationship between facts and values is not straightforward. A reasonable discussion between people of differing opinions requires clarity about whether the exact area of disagreement concerns:
- knowledge of facts (disagreement about whether or not a particular animal suffers from being used in a particular kind of research, or about the actual conditions of the research environment);
- the interpretation of values associated with facts (agreement that animals involved in a particular experiment experience pain, but disagreement about whether or not causing this pain is morally wrong); and
- the way that values are derived from facts (disagreement about whether or not animals are capable of being members of the ‘moral community’, and if they are, how we might know, see Box 3.1).
3.7 Secondly, even if the source of disagreement is identified, the question arises of what to do if one’s own moral judgement is in conflict with new facts, evidence or arguments presented by others. On one view, such disagreement is unavoidable and, in principle, irreconcilable. Since facts are usually interpreted differently within frameworks of different ethical theories or belief systems, it is not surprising that proponents with different viewpoints will differ in their judgements. However, this is only true if ethical frameworks are construed as being unchangeable in principle. On a different view, new circumstances may enjoin us to test and, where necessary, revise our frameworks. This can apply to both proponents of particular ethical theories, as well as to people who have not considered ethical issues raised by animal research in a systematic way, but who nevertheless hold strong views.
These processes of revision are sometimes described as striving to achieve a ‘reflective equilibrium’ which consists:‘… in working back and forth among our considered judgments (some say our ‘intuitions’) about particular instances or cases [the relationship to judgments about similar cases], the principles or rules that we believe govern them, and the theoretical considerations that we believe bear on accepting these considered judgments, principles, or rules, revising any of these elements wherever necessary in order to achieve an acceptable coherence among them. The method succeeds and we achieve reflective equilibrium when we arrive at an acceptable coherence among these beliefs. An acceptable coherence requires that our beliefs not only be consistent with each other (a weak requirement), but that some of these beliefs provide support or provide a best explanation for others.’2
Thus, consideration of the many ways in which animals are used in research may require us not only to simply apply our system of beliefs to this specific matter but, in doing so, to accept the possibility that some parts of our belief system may require revision. Openness towards such a process would lead to more refined ethical theories and belief systems and it could also help identify possible policy reforms to generate practices that are acceptable to those holding a range of moral views.3
3.8 In this chapter, we generally do not take a view as to whether or not, and if so on what basis, particular arguments in favour or against the use of animals in research are justified. Rather, we comment on possible weaknesses of specific arguments and return to a more detailed outline of specific positions in Chapters 14 and 15.
Footnotes2 Daniels N (2003) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Reflective equilibrium, available at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium/#1. Accessed on: 11 Apr 2005.
3 See also Thagard P (2000) Coherence in Thought and Action (MIT-Press).