Ethics of Research involving animals
Provided there are substantial benefits associated with animal research, why should the use of animals require special justification? - continuation I
none, to give personal support to every child. If we apply this argument to the case of medical research undertaken to alleviate human suffering, we could infer that there is a strong obligation not to cause suffering, but a weaker one to alleviate it.
3.12 We agree that there is a plausible argument for morally relevant differences between specific kinds of action. While there may often be less forceful reasons for requiring acts in comparison to omissions, it does not, however, follow from this that there is no moral obligation to pursue research to alleviate suffering. First, the obligation may merely be less strong. Secondly, it could reasonably be argued that there exists a prima facie ethical duty to help alleviate suffering through acts, provided research efforts are in proportion to the extent of suffering to be alleviated. It remains unresolved at this stage as to whether such an obligation automatically sanctions the use of animals. The obligation relates primarily to the principle of alleviation of suffering, rather than to a prescription of specific ways in which suffering is to be relieved. In principle, the obligation might also be fulfilled by research that does not involve the use of animals, provided alternative methods are available.
Is all research aimed at developing treatment for severe suffering that can only be alleviated through medicines?
3.13 In the UK, approximately one third of all research involving animals is undertaken by the pharmaceutical industry to develop new treatments for a wide range of human diseases (see Chapter 8). Many would argue that, wherever the use of animals is scientifically unavoidable, it is ethically acceptable to use them. Some people may think that animal research is only undertaken to develop new medicines for serious diseases such as cancer or HIV/AIDS. While this is correct in several instances, consideration must also be given to the fact that pharmaceutical companies operate in a highly competitive sector. The need to generate profits may not always lead to the development of interventions that are most needed or reduce the greatest suffering, but may instead encourage the manufacture of those interventions that promise the highest returns. It has been suggested that animals are sometimes used in research where patient need is not clearly defined, for example, in the development of medicines that are thought to differ only marginally from existing products.6 It is therefore important to ask whether products that are developed always justify the use of animals. One respondent to the Consultation also questioned whether the use of animals in pharmaceutical research was justified in view of the fact that: ‘Many of the known human ailments are caused via humans not leading healthy lifestyles…’ Francis H Giles
3.14 The argument that the suffering induced by anima experimentation is always outweighed by the fact that the burden of human disease is reduced by new pharmaceutical interventions can therefore lead to over-simplifications. Human health is affected by a spectrum of different kinds of disease and consequent suffering. The justification of animal research is more difficult when the disease in question could be avoided by appropriate human behaviour. It may be more straightforward where diseases emerge spontaneously and are independent of human behaviour. Thus, generalisations about the necessity of using animals are often unhelpful. In some cases animal suffering is weighed directly against human suffering; in other cases the reluctance of patients to achieve health improvements by changing their behaviour needs to be considered, as well as the pressures on pharmaceutical companies to maximise commercial revenue.7 Lastly, as we observed above, pharmaceutical research accounts for approximately one third of animals used. Research is also undertaken in the context of basic research (30%, see Chapter 5) and toxicity testing (16%, see Chapter 9), which require different kinds of justification (paragraph 3.53).
‘Engaging in research is a part of human nature’
3.15 We need to consider one further argument that is relevant to our exploration of the need for the justification of animal research. Some people assert that it is an essential trait of humans to strive for knowledge through methodological enquiry. Hence, independent of the value of the results of research, it could be argued that research activity itself holds significant intrinsic value. For those who hold this view, undertaking research, including that involving animals, can be equated with the value of foraging for apes and nest-building for birds. They might therefore argue that it would be wrong to expect humans to cease undertaking animal research, because it is part of their natural behaviour.
3.16 Arguments based on ‘naturalness’ have considerable currency in the debate about animal research. However, there is disagreement about the usefulness of notions of naturalness (paragraphs 3.24–3.26). It is also questionable whether the alleged natural drive for humans to undertake research and advance knowledge would be irredeemably frustrated if they refrained from using animals. One respondent to the Consultation observed that ‘necessity is the mother of invention’, and hence it could be argued that if there was a political will not to use animals, human creativity might produce other solutions to achieve the same research goals.
3.17 It would appear that arguments about the loss of opportunities in both scientific research and gaining knowledge would only be forceful where, for compelling logical, ethical or pragmatic reasons, there was no possibility to obtain specific information using non-animal methods (see paragraphs 3.63–3.66). For example, it could be contended that it would be neither pragmatically feasible nor ethically permissible to produce inbred strains of humans for genetic knock-out studies (see paragraph 5.20). However, in an ethical discussion we might ask what exactly are the reasons that appear to make it ethically permissible to use mice, but ethically wrong to use humans, for genetic knock-out studies. We therefore now turn to the second question introduced in paragraph 3.10.
Footnotes6 However, others claim that incremental improvements in the safety, efficacy, selectivity and utility of medicines are highly beneficial for patients and consumers. See Wertheimer A, Levy R and O’Connor TW (2001) Too many drugs? The clinical and economic value of incremental innovations Investing in Health: The Social and Economic Benefits of Health Care Innovation
14: 77–118, Executive Summary available at: http://www.npcnow.org/resources/PDFs/executivesummary_toomanydrugs.pdf
7 Specific issues raised by the fact that not all research has immediate applications are considered in paragraph 3.53.