Ethics of Research involving animals
The relationship between moral status and morally relevant features - continuation I
| Box 3.2: Cognitive capacities of animals
Communication Chimpanzees communicate through vocal sounds, facial expressions, postures and touch. They have an elaborate hierarchal social structure and use a complex communication system. For example, they alert other chimpanzees to the whereabouts of food sources with grunts and barks.* Tool use Tufted capuchin monkeys have been observed in the wild using stones to dig in the ground to forage for food and to crack seeds.† In captivity they have been observed carrying probing tools to a fixed apparatus baited with syrup in order to obtain the syrup.‡ Great apes are competent tool users in the wild as well as in captivity. For example, captive chimpanzee mothers have been observed showing their infants how to selectively use tools for tasks such as obtaining honey from a container.∫ Other monkeys have been observed washing food, such as potatoes, in the sea, in order to make them more palatable.** Intelligence Dogs have been shown to know the names of many objects by retrieving them as instructed. For example, a border collie called Rico was shown to be able to associate words with over 200 different items and make hypotheses about the meanings of words. Rico could correctly retrieve a new item from among a selection of eleven items already known, by inferring that the word mentioned did not refer to any of the ten items already known.†† Rats and mice perform tasks that make sensory, motor, motivational and information processing demands. Rodents are able to navigate in mazes or find platforms hidden in coloured water. Social behaviour Reciprocity is commonly seen within groups of capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees, involving behaviours such as food sharing, grooming and cooperation.‡‡ * See, for example, The Jane Goodall Institute Chimp Calls, available at: http://www.janegoodall.org/jane/studycorner/ chimpanzees/chimp-calls.asp. Accessed on: 18 Apr 2005. † Moura ACdeA and Lee PC (2004) Capuchin stone tool use in Caatinga Dry Forest Science 306: 1909. ‡ Cleveland A, Rocca AM, Wendt EL and Westergaard GC (2004) Transport of tools to food sites in tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) Anim Cogn 7: 193–8. ∫ Hirata S and Celli ML (2003) Role of mothers in the acquisition of tool-use behaviours by captive infant chimpanzees Anim Cogn 6: 235–44. ** See De Waal F (2001) The Ape and the Sushi Master: Cultural reflections of a primatologist (New York: Basic Books). †† Kaminski J, Call J and Fischer J (2004) Word learning in a domestic dog: evidence for ‘fast mapping’ Science 304: 1682–3. ‡‡ See Brosnan SF and de Waal FBM (2002) A proximate perspective on reciprocal altruism Hum Nat 13: 129–52. ∫∫ Wilkinson GS (1990) Food sharing in vampire bats Sci Am 262: 76–82. ¶ Brosnan SF and de Waal FBM (2003) Monkeys reject unequal pay Nature 425: 297–9. ¶¶ BBC News (2004) Dolphins prevent NZ shark attack, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4034383.stm. Accessed on: 18 Apr 2005. |
3.34 Nevertheless, the degree to which animals of different types are capable of expressing higher cognitive capacities remains highly contentious. Clearly, though, it seems that in behavioural terms many animals are capable of demonstrating dissent by attempting to flee. It can therefore be argued that the implications of an animal’s inclusion in an experiment that it seeks to evade is something that should be taken into account. At the same time, we should hesitate before drawing the opposite conclusion: that an animal that takes part apparently willingly does so freely. Participation can be achieved through training, which most likely lessens the possible stressfulness of research, but cannot be taken to mean the same as consent given freely from a competent human research participant. For example, an animal may have realised that cooperation with researchers is the only means of leaving a cage or pen, or gaining access to food, and it may ‘agree’ to take part for these reasons.
3.35 It is plausible to associate the ability to exercise higher cognitive capacities with neurological complexity. This is not to say that ‘more-developed’ animals are more important than ‘lessdeveloped’ ones, but that there are more morally questionable ways of mistreating the more-developed animals.
3.36 Some object to a view in which moral status is based solely on higher cognitive capacities. This is because it appears that such views fail to offer grounds for refraining from causing unlimited pain or suffering to those beings that lack such capacities. But, as we have said, it cannot be taken for granted that any one of the morally relevant features that we consider here can be taken to be a master property. Rather, there are several reasons for showing moral concern, one of which is capacity to feel pain, which applies to many animals that do not exhibit higher cognitive capacities.
Capacity to flourish
3.37 A further basis of moral concern, associated with Aristotle, is the idea of animals having a telos, a good, or alternatively having interests or species-specific needs. If the animals are able to satisfy these needs, one might say that they flourish. This concept enables us to say that things may go well or badly for an animal depending on how specific environmental conditions relate to its usual species-specific development (see paragraphs 4.23–4.26 and 4.41).14 If this view is not simply to be considered equivalent to those already considered (sentience and higher cognitive capacities), there must be a sense in which animals can flourish or wither independently of these features.
3.38 One way in which the concept might theoretically be extended is to focus not only on avoiding pain and suffering (which may require primarily consideration of sentience and higher cognitive capacities), but to consider also what environmental enrichments can be provided to attend to the species-specific needs. Animals may fail to flourish in laboratory conditions whether or not they experience pain, suffering or premature death.
3.39 While it may sometimes be difficult to determine when life is best for an animal, the concept seems to have clear force in relation to identifying circumstances that fundamentally violate the expression of significant biologically determined features of a species. For example, if animals such as dogs, which are a roaming species, are kept in very small and confined pens for prolonged periods of time, they would usually display stereotypic behaviours, which indicate that the animal is stressed. But keeping animals in unnatural environments need not always lead to welfare infringements.
The relevant question to ask is not whether the environment is natural or not (in nature too, animals can encounter a number of adverse conditions) but whether it is appropriate with regard to its species-specific capacities and needs. Thus, if animals have been bred in captivity and are provided with a sufficiently complex environment, they may in principle be able to develop their potential in similar ways to animals living in the wild (see paragraph 4.26).
In any case, the concept of flourishing can be seen as important as it establishes a more comprehensive idea of animal well-being than just freedom from pain and suffering.
3.40 Another extension of the concept of flourishing relates to considerations about the moral value of a species. This may be especially relevant to issues raised by selective breeding and the genetic modification of animals. These processes usually aim at altering an aspect of the genotype of a species in a targeted and often unprecedented way. In the context of basic research, a great number of experiments are now conducted in which single genes, or combinations of genes, are either introduced or deleted in research animals, and the effects of these actions are then assessed in order to increase understanding about genetic and associated developmental processes (see paragraphs 5.20 and 7.5). A spectrum of views on GM animals was reflected in the responses to the Consultation, for example:
‘Animals should under no circumstances be genetically modified. It is going against nature, is dangerous…, and the animals… are often born mutated and are in pain and misery however long their lives.’ Ms Jenny Williams ‘Genetically manipulating and cloning animals breach the intrinsic value of each animal species and is ethically unacceptable…. Genetic modification is clearly promoting an increase in animal use…’ The Dr Hadwen Trust for Humane Research ‘GM animals… raise issues of commodification: should we modify animals to make them more economically productive? Discourses of ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ provide dubious grounds from which to stand within an ethical argument.’ Dr Richard Twine, UK ‘GM animals have already proven enormously valuable in biomedical research, in many cases facilitating a reduction in the number of animals used in medical research.’
The Bioindustry Association
3.41 Genetic modification is a subject of considerable moral debate. Many members of the scientific community would deny that most cases of GM animals are more ‘unnatural’ than conventionally bred animals, or that the technique compromises the flourishing of animals in new and special ways. They point to the fact that selective breeding of animals dates back to the beginnings of agriculture and domestication, and that it has been used extensively within scientific research; for example, to create inbred strains of genetically identical animals or to sustain scientifically interesting mutations. Practically all conventionally bred animals used in agriculture, research or kept as pets are unnatural in the sense that they represent carefully selected genotypes from within a wide range of genetic variation that exists in the species. Proponents of this view also argue that there is no substantial difference in principle between more traditional forms of genetic selection and genetic modification;15 that any animal produced through genetic modification could theoretically also have been created by means of selective breeding; and that the main difference is that genetic modification is faster and more precise.
3.42 While some of those who do not share this view might agree that arguments for species integrity are not straightforward, they may challenge the suggestion that no new issues are raised by the GM approach. For example, they may assert that the more gradual processes of selective breeding enable researchers to detect possible welfare-related problems at an earlier stage, as such problems may manifest themselves in smaller increments, and can be assessed against known strains of animals. By contrast, the ‘sudden’ introduction of a distant gene in a new organism by the GM method may lead to unexpected and unpredictable implications for welfare, especially in mutagenesis, ‘knock-out’ and ‘knock-in’ studies (see paragraphs 4.57 and 5.20–5.23). Although most researchers consider that the vast majority of such studies do not have any negative consequences for the animals involved, the evidence so far is inconclusive (see paragraph 4.57). The GM approach may also lead to very considerable increases in fetal mortality, and high levels of ‘wastage’ of animals that fail to develop the desired mutations (paragraph 5.23).
3.43 Alternatively, opponents to the GM approach might agree that the technique does not differ fundamentally from some forms of selective breeding, but consider that it amplifies the problem of deliberately interfering with a species’ genotype in ways that can cause harm. If these observations are correct, the moral discussion then becomes focused on the extent to which genetic modification, and other forms of selective breeding, can be conducted without causing harm, as implied by the following response to the Consultation, which focuses on the consequences,16 rather than the act, of modification:
‘We…consider that it is unlikely that it matters, from the animal’s point of view, whether any state of suffering was achieved by genetic manipulation or other means.’ AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals UK
Sociability
3.44 Another philosophical tradition, influenced by philosophers such as Karl Marx, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger, sees sociability as creating a level of moral concern. According to this tradition, being a member of some form of complex community creates moral relations of rights and duties. The basis of such a community might be language or a substantial dependence on others for extensive social, economic or other reasons. But, if this tradition is not to be considered equivalent to the view of higher cognitive capacities discussed above, simply with the additional observation that these capacities develop through complex social interaction such as language use, then it must be sociability itself, rather than socially developed attributes, that generates moral concern next page
Footnotes14 By species-specific development we mean behaviours and dispositions that the animal has developed during evolution in
order to be able to respond to the range of situations typically encountered in its natural habitat.
15 The Royal Society (2001) The use of genetically modified animals (London: The Royal Society).