Ethics of Research involving animals
Discussion: four views on animal research
14.13 We now consider these four positions in more detail. Before doing so, it is worth referring to an issue briefly raised in Chapter 3: the relevance of the solidaristic preference that many human beings have for each other over animals. We noted that from one viewpoint this was considered ‘speciesism’, analogous to racism or sexism, while from another this preference is fully justified (see paragraph 2.17 and Box 3.4). Indeed, from some views such preferences are themselves the basis of morality. This reasoning expresses itself in a number of ways. It can draw on the biological or evolutionary order of humans and other animals, or on philosophical or religious frameworks. For example, the higher status of humans visŕ- vis animals can be based on the Judeo-Christian tradition, in which a moral difference between human beings and animals may be presumed by the order of creation in Genesis.3
14.14 As we will see the ‘abolitionist’ view considers that whatever moral strength such solidaristic preferences have, universalistic morality silences them. The weakness of morality view agrees that this ought to be the case but denies that morality can, in practice, overturn such a powerful psychological drive. The ‘moral dilemma’ view, at least in one version, accepts both the universalistic argument of the abolitionists, while also accepting that solidaristic reasoning has a moral foundation. This tension can be what causes the dilemma. Finally those holding the ‘on balance justification’ or the ‘anything goes’ views usually believe that species solidarity outweighs universalistic morality. Consequently we see that the question of the nature and value of human solidaristic preferences for each other is, morally speaking, right at the heart of this debate. Some view such preferences as immoral, while others see them as absolutely at the heart of morality. We cannot settle this question, although we can acknowledge its powerful psychological grip on many humans and its crucial role in the debate.
14.15 With this background in mind we now address for each view four questions: (i) what is the justification for using animals in research? (ii) how does the justification relate to the treatment of animals in other contexts? (iii) what is the value of research? (iv) what is the role of the Three Rs?
The ’anything goes’ view
Justification for using animals in research
14.16 As we have said, all members of the Working Party agree that research involving animals requires ethical justification. People holding different views might refer to the philosophers Malebranche and Descartes, who established a dualistic conception of mind and body that only applied to humans, arguing that animals lacked relevant cognitive capacities. According to Descartes, animals were not sentient or capable of suffering pain or distress (paragraphs 3.30 and 4.4). Based on a somewhat different assumption, in the 1960s proponents of a philosophical approach called behaviourism came to similar sceptical conclusions about mental capacities of animals. Although this approach still features in some journalistic contributions4 to the ethical debate about animal research, it has little currency in contemporary academic discussion.
Using animals in research and in other contexts
14.17 We have observed that a useful way of addressing ethical issues raised by harmful uses of animals is to identify morally relevant features, and to assess how these features should be considered in moral reasoning. The Cartesian and similar approaches simply focus on one of these features (higher cognitive capacities), and consider that this justifies categorising all animals as outside of the moral community (see Box 3.1). Nonetheless, even such radical approaches which deny animals any moral status need not allow any wanton cruelty towards them, as it can be argued that humans who are cruel to animals are more likely to be cruel to humans (the Kantian argument). Thus, the most liberal framework conceivable5 with regard to the use of animals in research could still prohibit some treatments of animals in other contexts; for example, some forms of hunting, or pest control without regard to the way in which animals were killed.
The value of research
14.18 Although the ’anything goes’ view is hardly a feature of the current debate, some people, for example those affected by severe diseases such as cystic fibrosis, Huntington’s or Parkinson’s might argue for a very low threshold in specific cases. Some patients waiting for new or improved therapeutic interventions could take the view that the interests of animals used for medical research should be given far less consideration than their own, regardless of whether experiments are at an early stage in basic research, for example, to understand disease processes, or at more advanced stages, such as to test a new therapeutic intervention. To others, such an argument based on need appears unjustified, and they point out that there are also a great number of patients who disagree and prefer not to cause animals suffering in their name.
14.19 Research on diseases such as cystic fibrosis or neurodegenerative disorders involves animals at different levels of neurological and behavioural development, ranging from mice to primates. It will therefore infringe on the animal’s morally relevant properties (sentience, higher cognitive capacities, capacity to flourish, sociability and possession of a life) to varying degrees. We observed above that the question of whether or not other animals, and particularly primates, have higher cognitive capacities that can be compared in a meaningful way to those of humans is the subject of continuing research paragraphs 3.30, 4.4 and 4.27). No member of the Working Party is persuaded that a person’s experience of suffering can justify the unlimited imposition of pain or suffering by research animals, regardless of whether they are mice or primates. However, we agree that patients’ views should be fully considered in deliberations about the permissibility of animal research alongside other voices in the debate.
The role of the Three Rs
14.20 While views on the Three Rs may differ among those sympathetic to the ’anything goes’ view, many proponents may view them with scepticism. Although Refinement will be relevant to all those who do not deny the capacity of suffering to animals, in general the Three Rs are likely to be of interest primarily insofar as they contribute to more economic and effective scientific progress, for example where Refinements are necessary so as not to compromise the scientific validity of results from animal research.6
The ’on balance justification’ view
Justification for using animals in research
14.21 In Chapter 3 we referred to a number of normative ethical theories in our attempt to determine the appropriate consideration of morally relevant features of animals. These theories include deontological, consequentialist, utilitarian and virtue-ethics-based approaches and all may be used to justify some animal research. Many approaches have as their basis the argument that there is a moral primacy of humans over animals. There are also arguments based on the biological or evolutionary order of humans and other animals (paragraphs 3.20–3.26) as well as religious frameworks or other notions of solidaristic preference (paragraph 14.14).
14.22 Unlike proponents of the ’anything goes’ view, supporters of this view acknowledge that research entails costs to animals, which must be taken seriously in moral reasoning. However, very often the benefits to human beings are seen to morally outweigh the costs to animals. Proponents point to the statistics about the level of pain, suffering and distress experienced by animals in research and note that, for example, 39 percent of project licences in force at the end of 2003 were classified as mild (56 percent as moderate, see Appendix 2). They take the Statistics to be broadly representative of animal suffering, view the levels as acceptable, and emphasise that the law requires that experiments must be designed to use the minimum number of animals, drawn from the species with the lowest neurophysiological sensitivity. They further argue that the welfare implications are experienced in far less negative ways by animals than by humans (paragraphs 3.29). Hence, in view of the important goals of many research programmes using animals, and the lack of alternatives, they argue that in accepting animal research they act with full moral justification. Nonetheless they can also hold that every reasonable step must be taken to reduce the costs that fall on animals, and that some forms of research are not justified.
Using animals in research and in other contexts
14.23 On most versions of the ’on balance justification’ view, it would appear that the more harmful the experiment, the ‘higher’ the animal used, the less significant the goal, the lower the probability of success and the greater the availability of alternatives, then the less likely the experiment is to be considered ethically acceptable (see also Figure 14.1).
14.24 In support of the acceptability of undertaking harmful research on animals rather than on humans, this view endorses the thesis set out in paragraph 3.29, according to which suffering and especially death pose greater tragedies for humans than for animals. It can follow from this argument that special consideration must be given to primates as they may suffer comparatively more than other animals from confinement and relative social isolation. For the same reason, proponents can accept a prohibition on the use of the great apes, and are inclined to apply the morally relevant criterion of ‘sociability’ to animals such as dogs (see paragraphs 3.44-3.46). Although the ’on balance justification’ view could suggest a hierarchical order of the acceptability of using different species of animals for research, this need not necessarily be so (paragraph 3.22).7
14.25 Those who accept the use of animals for research purposes as defined by the A(SP)A usually also accept other uses of animals. In fact, the use of animals for food and clothing, for example, may be cited in support of research involving animals, as humans appear to be willing to sacrifice the lives and often also the quality of lives of animals, for human interests. We have already observed that such comparisons cut both ways. Thus, since the A(SP)A requires justification of harmful research, proponents of the ’on balance justification’ view could be expected to explore similar justifications, albeit perhaps in a less formalised manner, with regard to other uses of animals. It is then important to relate the worthiness of the goal to the suffering of the animal involved, and the availability of alternative ways of achieving the goal. The ’on balance justification’ view can therefore allow for all, or most of, the uses noted earlier on (paragraph 4.47 and Appendix 1). At the same time, it also allows for the conclusion that, although the use of animals is acceptable for many research goals, it is far less acceptable for the production of food or clothing, since in most Western societies relatively straightforward alternatives exist that could provide food and clothing without the use of animals.
Figure 14.1
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3 The Biblical justification of the superiority of humans over animals was based on the claim that God had created humans, uniquely, in his own image, giving them the highest status among living beings (see Book of Genesis (1:28) (2001) The Holy Bible, English Standard Version (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Bibles): ‘And God said to them [man], "Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the heavens and over every living thing that moves on the earth."’) However, as noted above (paragraph 3.21) this view should not be taken to mean that humans are free to treat animals in any way they please. In fact, it may well enjoin them to maximise animal welfare as far as possible. This interpretation would not only be compatible with Christianity, but also, for example, with Judaism and Islam. Religious arguments can support a range of views which we discuss in the remainder of this Chapter, especially the ‘on balance justification’ view (paragraphs 14.21-14.27) and the ‘moral dilemma’ view (paragraphs 14.28-14.40). While we have not considered the special perspective of different religions on the question of animal research in this Chapter, we are clear that for many people it would be wrong to suggest that a strict distinction between religious, ethical and public policy perspectives can be made. We therefore present the outline of the four views that follow on the understanding that religious arguments can be of equal status and relevance in the justification of specific uses of animals, as those grounded in secular ethical theory. For a further discussion of religious perspectives on the use of animals see Linzay A (1995) Animal Theology (Illinois: University ofvIllinois Press).
4 Guldberg H (2004) Why Humans are Superior to Apes Spiked 24 February, available at: http://www.spikedonline. com/Printable/0000000CA40E.htm. Accessed on 6 May 2005.
5 See footnote 2.
6 Derbyshire S (2001) Animal Research: A scientist's defence Spiked 29 March, available at: http://www.spikedonline.
com/Printable/000000005547.htm. Accessed on 6 May 2005.
7 First, more developed animals are not necessarily more important than the less developed ones, but it is simply the case that
there are more morally questionable ways of treating the more developed than the less developed. Secondly, the view can allow
for the conclusion that the use of a ‘less developed’ animal such as a mouse is less acceptable than the use of ‘higher’ species, such as a primate. Pain and suffering experienced by a ‘lower’ species may have a much more ‘global’ effect than pain experienced by a higher species (see paragraph 4.17).